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I. PREFACE*
In the 1970s, states began to experiment with what was called the
central panel system of administrative adjudication – an approach
first utilized in California in 1945. In this new model, administrative
law judges (ALJs) would not be employed by the agencies whose
cases they hear, but by a distinct central panel agency created solely
to manage them.
The central panel system is a framework to increase the
judicialization of the state administrative process by seeking to keep
ALJs separate from the agencies they serve, and to thereby ensure
fair, high-caliber decision-making within an environment that
promotes cost efficiencies.
Much of the discussion historically has been about the problems
each central panel agency had faced in being created, and the even
bigger challenges in getting the funding necessary for the present and
for the expansion that each wanted. Every central panel is different,
shaped either by the legislative battles that led to its creation, or the
debates that led to the Executive Order creating the central panel.
These differences involve how these central panels operated,
including the kinds of cases they heard, how the agency was funded,
Ѱ
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how decision-making independence was insured, and whether there
are cost efficiencies.
Legislative battles to create the central panel agencies often led to
selected agencies being exempted in order to avoid a potentially
deadly political battle. Sometimes agencies provided the opposition;
sometimes unions provided the opposition; sometimes differing
viewpoints between the executive and legislative branches led to a
particular compromise. But a consistent tension was always whether
an ALJ should be a specialist or a generalist. And always lurking in
the background was the question of whether an ALJ should have
final decision-making authority.
In 1981, there were seven central panel agencies. On May 8,
1981, a workshop was held in Chicago to provide a forum for
exchange of information about state and federal ALJs and researchers
doing work in the administrative law area. The event was cosponsored by the American Judicature Society and the
Administrative Conference of the U.S. - and became a forum for the
candid discussion of similarities and differences between the state
and federal adjudicative system and a consideration of the strengths
and weaknesses of central panel systems.
The November 1981 issue of Judicature was devoted to the
administrative law process. The articles, written by both researchers
and practitioners, provided an overview of the central panel approach
and how they operated. In 1983, a monograph was produced utilizing
new research and the outcomes from the 1981 workshop (The
Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of
Seven States, by Malcolm C. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar).
Over the next thirty years, there was substantial growth in the
central panel approach with more than thirty state and municipalities
adopting the central panel system. In September 2014, I was
contacted by Judge Larry Craddock who asked me to assist in doing a
new research study of the central panel system with an emphasis on
what had changed to lead to the movement’s growth, how central
panels were currently operating, and what were the pros and cons of
the approach thirty years after the initial study. Judge Craddock, who
recently passed away, was a tireless advocate who promoted social
justice generally, and the quality and independence of administrative
adjudication, in particular. He had come to believe that the central
panel approach was a key to reaching these goals and wanted to
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promote research around the central panel efforts. I agreed to lead the
research effort.
The purpose of this report is to provide a picture of the current
state of the central panel system, now that the panels have had
decades to operate. This picture includes the structure of the panels
and the pros and cons of central panels. It includes insights into the
central panel approach, including fairness and due process,
efficiency, cost reduction, hiring, training, and supervision. We also
focus on one of the most controversial of the issues surrounding
central panels—the independence of ALJs, including final decisionmaking authority. We present our survey results which provide a
description of the central panel phenomenon and conclude with
suggested best practices.
The authors, in doing this study, have met many persons who
have dedicated their professional lives to leading and studying
government systems that promise fair, efficient, and high-quality
adjudication. In addition to the Judge Craddock, we wish to thank
Judge Julian Mann, Judge Robert Cohen, and Judge Lorraine Lee for
their guidance. We thank Roger Lewis, Emily Gilman, and Kristen
Jones for their research and guidance. We also thank Lakeisha
Andress and Vinita Singh for their research assistance.
II. INTRODUCTION
The central panel movement has over the last 50 years changed
the landscape of administrative adjudication—changing the way
administrative law judges (ALJs) are utilized, including the finality
of their decisions, the uniformity of hearing procedures, and the
perceived fairness of the administrative process.
The central panel approach was created to bring a new level of
due process to state-based administrative adjudication. Hearings
within the central panel were designed to be cost efficient, uniform,
high quality, and fair to all parties. Over time, the goals of central
panels have expanded to include providing an effective, due processoriented environment for the increasing number of persons seeking
justice without the benefit of legal counsel.
The goal of this report is to document the growth of the central
panel movement that has now emerged in a majority of states. This
research is designed to provide data-informed recommendations to
states and municipalities considering the adoption of a central panel
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system or the enlargement of the jurisdiction encompassed by an
existing central panel as well as to states considering the adoption of
a more final decision-making authority for their central panel ALJs.
The work is also intended to inform the debate over whether the
central panel approach is something that the federal government
should consider.
This research looks at such issues as the cost efficiency of central
panels as well as the effect that central panels have on fairness. We
also look at what characteristics are most likely to increase efficiency
while maintaining the benefits of expertise and specialization,
including finality of decision-making, whether jurisdiction is
mandatory or optional, and how judges are assigned to cases.
III. A HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL PANEL APPROACH TO
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
The debate about the function and independence of ALJs is as old
as administrative law itself. Creating executive branch agencies with
adjudicative powers became a major part of American jurisprudence
in the New Deal era. But Roscoe Pound, the former dean of the
Harvard Law School, was concerned about the built-in conflicts
within administrative law as early as 1907, when he complained
about state and federal courts upholding constitutional statutes in
more than 50 cases that allowed executive agencies to have
administrative hearing officers.1
Pound quoted the French philosopher Montesquieu: “there is no
liberty if the power of judging is not separate from the legislative
power and from the executive power.”2 But despite Dean Pound’s
entreaties, the growth of administrative agencies with an adjudicative
component was abundant. The central panel approach was designed
to make the adjudication component independent from agency
functions while focusing on the fairness, quality, and effectiveness of
the adjudication.
In 1978, amendments to the federal Administrative Procedure Act
changed the term “hearing officer” into “administrative law judge”—

1
2

Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 55 U. PA. L. REV. 137 (1957).
Id.
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which demonstrated the growth in popularity, independence, and
prestige afforded to administrative adjudication.
ALJs have become an important part of the American justice
system. The life of nearly everyone is affected in some way by
decisions rendered by these “quasi-judicial” judges, yet the
administrative system of justice still does not receive the attention
that it deserves. State court judges are evaluated for retention
purposes by the voluntary bar associations, and court watching is a
common approach toward accountability in the state courts. State
ALJs, however, are in many ways the “hidden judiciary,” making
decisions often as important or even more important than those
rendered by our state judges.
The central panel is a framework that increases the judicialization
of the state administrative law process by seeking to keep ALJs
separate from the agencies they serve and to provide a hearing
process that is uniform, efficient, and accountable. In so doing, the
central panel approach seeks to ensure fair, high-caliber decisionmaking.
Starting more than fifty years ago, questions were raised about
the decision- making independence of ALJs who were employees of
the agencies comprising administrative justice. Were these ALJs to
be fact-finders for their employer agencies or were they independent
arbiters? Other questions were raised about the cost inefficiencies of
having each administrative agency house its own group of ALJs.
The administrative process was originally designed to serve as an
alternative to court action in complex economic and scientific
matters. It has expanded to a panoply of matters, from the most
complex – to social welfare, fact-driven matters where the litigants
are often pro se. The executive branch agencies have been the subject
of criticism over whether they adequately protect the rights of
litigants and whether they are employing policy fairly.
Administrative law judges, as employees of these administrative
agencies, have been included as part of this criticism.
The federal approach to these criticisms is to allow the ALJ to
remain an employee of a particular agency but to provide career
appointment (tenure until retirement) and to give responsibility for
the compensation and discipline of ALJs to bodies separate from the
agencies. On the state level, the central panel phenomenon is a
different reaction to these criticisms – removing ALJs from particular
agencies and placing them within an independent central panel

Fall 2019

The Need for a Central Panel Approach

7

agency. It is an experiment in administrative adjudication; indeed, it
is a state-based laboratory experimenting with an approach to better
ensure a high-quality, effective, efficient, and independent
administrative judiciary.
IV. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
Chicago Appleseed worked on its current central panel research
with an advisory panel of administrative law judges led by Judge
Larry Craddock as well as social scientists, pro bono lawyers, law
students, and graduate students in the social sciences. We have
collected data necessary to draw conclusions about how central
panels have evolved over time and what benefits they might offer
over a more traditional administrative law system. Our research has
included:
 A survey designed for Central Panel Directors,
Administrative Law Judges/Hearing Officers, Agency
Directors, and practitioners.
 Interviews with Central Panel Directors, ALJs, Agency
Directors, and practitioners. In these interviews, we
learned about what prompted the state to create the central
panel, stakeholders’ satisfaction with the central panel,
and challenges that arise both in the transition to a central
panel as well as with maintaining a central panel over
time.
 Interviews with experts and practitioners regarding the role
of central panel agencies within administrative
adjudication—the importance and impact of decisionmaking independence on lower-income persons and
economic efficiencies and effectiveness that affect
businesses and individuals. These interviewees included:
professors specializing in research around administrative
law; practitioners within legal aid and public interest
organizations who represent persons before administrative
tribunals; administrative agency personnel speaking to the
impact that a central panel is having or could have on
their operations; researchers who have been focusing on
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness of
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administrative adjudication; and persons who have
appeared before administrative hearing officers within the
administrative law system.
We consider the central panel approach a state-based laboratory
for making administrative adjudication fairer and more effective.
This report covers the following topics:
 History of the Central Panel Approach
 Implementing the Central Panel and the Reasons for the
Growth of this Approach
 Structure of Central Panels
 Role of the ALJ within the Central Panel
 Pros and Cons of a Central Panel System
 Insights into the Central Panel Approach: Fairness,
Efficiency, Cost Reduction, Hiring, Training, Supervision,
and the Issue of Generalist v. Specialist ALJs
 Independence of Administrative Law Judges, including
final decision-making authority
 Addressing Agency Concern with the Central Panel System
 Growth in the Central Panel Movement
 Survey Results: A Description of the Central Panels
 Suggested Practices of Central Panels and Central Panel
ALJs
V. THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF THE CENTRAL PANEL
In the 1970s, states began to experiment with what was called the
central panel system of administrative adjudication—an approach
first utilized in California in 1945. In this new system, rather than
being employed by the agencies whose cases they hear, ALJs would
be employed by a distinct central panel agency created solely to
manage them.
The central panel system is a framework to increase the
judicialization of the state administrative process by seeking to keep
ALJs separate from the agencies they serve and to thereby ensure
fair, high-caliber decision-making within an environment that
promotes cost efficiencies.
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Historically, much of the discussion has been about the problems
each central panel agency faced in its creation and the even-bigger
challenges in getting the funding necessary for the present as well as
for the future expansion that each wanted. Every central panel is
different, shaped by the legislative battles that led to its creation.
These differences involve how these central panels operate, including
the kinds of cases they hear, how the agency is funded, how decisionmaking independence is ensured, and whether there are cost
efficiencies.
Legislative battles to create the central panel agencies often led to
selected agencies being exempted in order to avoid a potentially
deadly political battle. Sometimes agencies provided the opposition;
sometimes unions provided the opposition; sometimes differing
viewpoints between the executive and legislative branches led to a
particular compromise. But a consistent tension was always whether
an ALJ should be a specialist or a generalist. And always lurking in
the background was whether an ALJ should have final decisionmaking authority.
We believe that administrative hearing officers are the hidden
judiciary, and administrative adjudication deserves the attention of
reform-minded practitioners who demand decision-making
independence, efficiency, and effectiveness from our justice system.
We say “hidden judiciary” because – while so much attention is paid
to the selection or election and evaluation of state court judges –
relatively little attention is paid to the administrative judiciary, who
often are handling cases just as complex and as important to society.
The central panel approach – the independent central panel
administrative agency that houses administrative hearing officers –
represents an innovation its proponents say improve the
administration of justice. Its opponents, however, say it is a step
toward reducing the discretion of administrative agencies and, thus,
toward reducing the effectiveness of the administrative process.
VI. RESEARCH ON THE EMERGING TREND: THE CENTRAL PANEL
California was the first state to create a central panel in 1945, but
it was not until the 1970s that the concept began to expand. In 1980,
the American Judicature Society (AJS) noted the central panel as an
emerging trend in administrative adjudication and began to research
the phenomenon.

10
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In May 1981, the seven directors of the central panel agencies
convened in Chicago for a first-ever meeting to discuss issues facing
central panels at the time. The meeting was co-sponsored by AJS and
the Administrative Conference of the U.S. The agenda was similar to
the issues facing central panels today. The panels were just beginning
to grow in jurisdiction, but agency pushback was a major subject of
discussion. Other topics of concern were how the central panels were
to be funded, technology, hiring and supervising procedures, quality
control, and whether central panel ALJs were to be specialists
(hearing one of a very few type of cases) or generalists (hearing a
variety of cases). Final decision authority was also on the agenda,
with an underlying theme of whether central panel ALJs were to be
more akin to Article III judges or remain extensions of the executive
agencies.
Based on the discussions over the two-day convening and a
written survey of those directors, AJS published a monograph
describing the operations of those seven central panels.3 In addition
to demographic information, the monograph looked at the pros and
cons of central panels as reported at the time.
Since 1981, there has been phenomenal growth in the number and
size of central panels. While there were only seven states with central
panels in 1981, by 2000 there were more than twenty central panels
at the state and municipal levels. Today there are more than thirty
states and municipalities that have moved to a central panel system of
administrative law judges. The number of judges and the amount of
funding for central panels has likewise increased substantially. In
1981, there were 160 central panel ALJs. In 2016, there were 787.
The total budget for state central panel agencies in 1981 was $10
million. In 2016, it was $257 million.4
VII. IMPLEMENTING THE CENTRAL PANEL AND THE REASONS FOR ITS
GROWTH

3 Rich & Brucar, The Central Panel System of Administrative Law Judges: A
Survey of Seven States (1983).
4 Id. More recent descriptive data can be found in the survey of central panels
conducted by the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law. This central panel
agency issues on an annual basis demographic information on state-based central
panels.
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The central panel movement involves an interactive web of
legislative negotiations, state-based politics, improving customer
service, the policies and procedures of the hearing system, due
process considerations, and perceived fairness. The central panel
seeks to balance due process concerns with administrative
effectiveness while retaining ALJ independence.
Central panels are formed in a number of ways and vary from
state to state. Typically, the governor, with the consent of the state
senate, appoints a chief ALJ or director to head the central panel.5
However, in other states, the chief ALJ or director may be appointed
by a wide array of other means. For example, in North Carolina, the
Chief Justice appoints the Chief ALJ, the Secretary of State appoints
the position in Tennessee, and in Wisconsin the chief ALJ is hired
through the civil service system.6
Most central panels are created through legislative action,
although Michigan and now Illinois are two states where the central
panels were created through executive order.
In 2016, Governor Bruce Rauner of Illinois established a pilot
central panel in Illinois.7 With a second executive order issued in
2017, the Illinois pilot is now a permanent part of the administrative
landscape in Illinois.8
In its first year, the Illinois central panel focused on things that
many of the other central panels have been working on—building a
high-quality infrastructure including elements such as uniformity of
hearing procedures and technology for hearing-data management.
In 2018, legislation was introduced to expand the jurisdiction of
the Illinois central panel with defined exceptions, including workers’
compensation cases—a popular exception among central panels. The
legislation failed to leave the legislative committee.
A. History of the Central Panel Movement

Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 117 (1994).
6 Interviews with central panel directors.
7 Executive Order 2016-06. Executive Order to Eliminate Backlog and Delay
in State Administrative Hearings.
8 Executive Order 2017-04. Executive Order to Continue and Expand
Successes in Improving State Administrative Proceedings.
5

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

12

39-1

The central panel systems are invariably implemented within an
existing structure of administrative adjudication. But the act of
implementing the systems has often spurred conflicts that at times
threatened the very existence of these panels. The changes that result
from the creation of a central panel have an ongoing impact on the
interests, values, and established practices of ALJs and agency
personnel.
With the exceptions of Michigan and Illinois, panels are created
through the actions of state legislatures, which establish the broad
duties and limits of the central panel in each state. The oldest central
panel in existence can be found in California. Begun in the mid1940s, the debate surrounding it occurred at about the same time that
arguments were being made in relation to the federal administrative
procedure act. California’s system ultimately became a model for
central panels established much later.
In the 1930s, the State Bar of California established study
committees to make recommendations to the legislature on
approaches to administrative reform. In 1938 the bar issued a report
seeking separation of the prosecuting and adjudication functions in
state agencies and a procedure for judicial review of administrative
decisions. The Judicial Council of California was directed by the
legislature in 1941 to undertake studies of judicial review of
administrative decisions and the need for changes in the procedures
of regulatory agencies. The proposals were limited to the field of
licensing, for the Judicial Council felt it was the area of
administrative practice most in need of change.9
The studies produced three proposals that were ultimately
embodied in the California Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of
1946. The studies proposed that a new department of administrative
procedure be created to devote “continuous and expert” attention to
the operation and procedure of the state’s administrative agencies.10
The department was also to furnish a home for a central panel of
ALJs.

Clarkson, The History of the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15
HASTINGS L.J. 137 (1964).
10 Id. For a further discussion of the California system, see Abrams,
Administrative Law judge Systems: The California View, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 487
(1977).
9
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Following the enactment of a central panel system in California,
other states began to enact a state administrative procedure act.
Tennessee and Massachusetts each established a centralized system
in 1974. The Tennessee central panel agency—the administrative
procedures division—was not established as a central panel. It was
created to hold hearings for the small boards and commissions under
public health and insurance.11
Later, the Tennessee APA was amended to state that agencies
that are not authorized to have their own hearing officers were
required to use the central panel, and other agencies could elect to
use central panel hearing officers. Opposition emerged from agencies
that were resistant to change. Each agency had its own way of doing
things and they were not happy being required to change.12
Central panels are often part of sweeping reforms in state
administrative procedure. An example is the Florida division of
administrative hearings, which began operations in November 1974.
It came about as part of a broad administrative reform effort during
which Florida substituted a new administrative procedure act. The
thrust of the change involved rulemaking as opposed to hearings. At
the heart of the creation of the Florida central panel was concern over
agencies’ use of rulemaking to accomplish what they could not do by
statute. The appearance of justice was a critical factor in convincing
the legislature to include a central panel system within the Florida
APA.13
Fiscal matters were of prime importance to the Colorado central
panel, created in the autumn of 1976. The catalyst for the creation of
that panel reportedly was the Attorney General’s Office, which
wished to promote decision-making independence and cost cutting.
Largely because proponents made arguments selling the panel on its
fiscal impact, the legislation slipped through “without anybody
noticing,” said one respondent.14
Changing ALJ roles and the politics surrounding the
implementation of central panels spawned a competition among
special interests in the various states. Some agency officials saw in
Interviews with central panel directors.
Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
11
12
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the legislative debates an attempt to replace their administrative
authority with the inflexible rule of law. Proponents of the legislation
saw the central panel approach as a way to improve the
administration of justice as well as to enhance the job status of ALJs.
Agency personnel saw the same legislation as an attempt both to
reduce the effectiveness of the process and to restrict the agency’s
ability to take action toward solving social problems. But those who
worked to pass the legislation creating these early central panels
often point to displeasure among some legislatures with agency
rulemaking by fiat, which the central panel was designed to
confront.15
While the legislatures often focused on fiscal matters and
agencies focused on their perceived loss of power, the debate
surrounding the creation of these early central panels often involved
ALJs who were very pleased to become part of the central panel. The
main attractions included an increased variety of cases,
independence, and often somewhat-higher pay than they had been
receiving as non-central panel ALJs. But even among the ALJs, the
change to hearing a variety of cases created for some of them a
substantial modification of work behavior that sometimes resulted in
job dissatisfaction.16
A related problem in creating these early central panels involved
the inherent structure of the central panel system. At the outset, ALJs
who had been assigned to agencies were transferred into the central
panels and then sometimes assigned to hear cases for their former
agencies as independent ALJs. Disputes with former agencies at
times spilled into the role of the central panel ALJ. Sometimes there
would be animosity between ALJs and their former agencies, which
appeared in what one observer described as cheap shots being taken
by ALJs—pointed comments directed against agency officials within
ALJ decisions.
B. The Role of the Bar Associations in Creating the Early Central
Panels

15
16

Id.
Id.
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The State Bar associations were often important factors in many
of the debates—not only in the creation of the early central panels.
Their role in the creation of central panels has continued. The bar
groups saw the central panel as a way of establishing enhanced
prestige for lawyers, a goal which was seen as important to an
association representing the interests of lawyers. But also at the heart
of the support by state bars was the goal of creating an independent
agency staffed by professionals with the sole function of conducting
administrative hearings.
VIII. THE STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL PANELS
At the outset, the scope of central panel operations was dictated
by the state legislatures through the state administrative procedure
acts. In general, a jurisdiction can be considered as mandatory
(agencies listed in the state APA must use central panel ALJs) or
voluntary (agencies may use the central panel services).17 Central
panels using a hybrid jurisdiction provide that the agencies can either
use their own hearing officers or those in the centralized panel.
Today, it is common for state legislation to delineate which
agencies do not have to utilize central panel ALJs. Proponents of the
mandatory system claim that ALJs will be independent of agency
influence only if agencies must utilize central panel ALJs for all of
their adjudications. An agency that can use its own hearing officers
will be free to consciously divide its hearing load between the two
types of ALJs. This, say the proponents of mandatory jurisdiction,
will destroy the appearance of justice that the central panel program
seeks. But advocates of voluntary jurisdiction argue that because
agency officials will feel less threatened by a voluntary use of central
panel ALJs, there would be fewer problems in implementing the
central panel.18
A. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge within the Central
Panel

17
18

Id.
Id.
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Related to the notion of ALJ independence is the amount of
expertise that an ALJ should bring to the hearing process. This was
the debate throughout the 1970s as the early central panels were
being created. Those who see little need for expertise believe that
ALJs have the ability to learn more than one area of the law and can
serve as generalists—administrative judges who are capable of
hearing a variety of types of cases. Critics subscribe to the view that
administrative judges are present and useful only because of their
specialized expertise in one area and, therefore, should only hear one
type of case.
Yet if the system assigns ALJs exclusively to one agency because
of the need for specialized expertise, will there be a risk of bias
among its ALJs that the central panel was devised to eliminate?
Others argue that the lack of specialized ALJ expertise leads to
inefficiency. These opponents also argue that ALJs without specific
knowledge will have to be educated by the parties and will
consequently be subject to manipulation.19 But acquiring information
from the parties has always been part of judging.
Today, the generalist-versus-specialist debate is resolved on a
state-by-state, panel-by-panel basis. Judges sometimes hear only one
type of case while others are assigned a variety of cases. In surveys
conducted in the 1980s and interviews conducted since 2016, the
results are similar. That is, central panels have developed hybrid
systems through which some ALJs maintain specialized expertise in
a very limited number of cases while other ALJs within the central
panel are more generalist in nature. What seems to be consistent
among ALJs we have surveyed and interviewed is that they tend to
be satisfied with their jobs in no small part because of the opportunity
to judge different areas of the law.
IX. PROS AND CONS OF A CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM
Since 2016, we have surveyed and interviewed central panel
directors and ALJs across the country. We have also interviewed
practitioners and agency personnel nationwide. In reporting the
results of these surveys and interviews, we seek to compare our
current results with those data collected in 1981 and 1982. The
19
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following are the comparative results. In a subsequent section, we
report the results of an electronic survey completed by twenty-three
central panel directors.
As we have discussed, debate over the pros and cons of a central
panel system began in California in 1945 and intensified during the
1970s and 1980s when there was substantial growth in the number of
central panels. The following pros and cons related to central panels
were part of the research we conducted both in the 1980s and during
the current effort.
 Proponents say that independent funding of central panels
promotes ALJ independence.
 Proponents of central panels claim that the central panel’s
more- efficient allocation of ALJs reduces costs. Larger
agencies will not have to keep all the ALJs they need to
handle peak periods; smaller agencies will always have
ALJs available to them.
 Implementing a central panel transfers some degree of
financial control from the agency to the panel. No longer
do the agencies have exclusive administrative and
financial control of the hearing process and, as a result,
the system is a potential source of conflict. These
concerns become evident during the changeover as well as
during the preceding legislative debates.
 Existing operations are funded in one of two ways. One
approach is known as general funding. The state
legislature appropriates a set amount of money which it
transfers to the central panel agency to use as an operating
budget. The other approach is the revolving fund, in
which the central panel bills agencies for the use of its
hearing services on an hourly basis. Under revolving
funding, the agencies are appropriated funds by the state
legislature. Central panels utilize both methods of
funding, but their leaders are consistent in their
conclusion that general funding is the best way to ensure
the independence of central panel ALJ decision-making.
 Proponents say the central panel will allow cost cutting
through administrative efficiencies and encourage
administrative cost-cutting innovations. By using the

18
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adjudication services of the central panel, administrative
agencies with a small number of ALJs will be able to
eliminate administrative overhead costs by transferring
their hearing function to the central panel.







In cases where ALJs issue final rather than recommended
decisions, cost savings will accrue from agency staff and
litigants not having to conduct and participate in a secondstage adjudication proceeding.
Proponents say central panel ALJs can hear a variety of
cases so that they will always be approaching a problem
from a fresh perspective.
Proponents say the central panel will encourage uniform
policies and procedures and will allow for more efficient
collection and analysis of hearing data.
Proponents see the judicialization of ALJs to be a good
thing, but opponents of the central panel approach see it
as a step toward reducing the power of agencies, making
the system unnecessarily inefficient.
Opponents say that placing all decisions relating to ALJ
employment in the hands of agencies risks creating the
appearance of bias. They point to the sometimes-political
appointment of central panel directors as a source of
political intervention into the administrative adjudication
process.
The directors of central panels are often appointed
through the state political structure. Once appointed,
directors are given administrative control over the
operations. To ensure independence, however, the term of
office is often not in direct overlap with the term of the
then-governor, and we heard no instance where governors
have sought to influence the decision-making of the
central panels.
ALJs are most often protected by the civil service system,
while their director can be removed at will by the
executive. This has raised the issue of whether central
panel directors who are selected by elected officials may
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appear susceptible to influence from the official who
nominated them.
Directors always downplay this possibility and note
that they consider their positions to be apolitical.
Some note that their position has a benefit in terms of
their ability to work with members of the legislature to
bring about a more efficient and just policy for the central
panel. A director familiar with and accepted by the
political system, they say, can better resist attempts by a
governor, for example, to interfere with the administrative
process. These directors see their role as a buffer between
state government and the decision-making independence
of ALJs.20
 Proponents of central panel systems note that central panels
have low filing fees and, in many cases, no filing fees at
all.
 Proponents of central panel systems note the new types of
cases now being heard in some central panels that
formerly were in the province of the state court judiciary,
including corrections and child support. In general, these
proponents note the accountability of central panel ALJs.
State court judges are evaluated rarely—often just as part
of a re-election bid, and then only for educating voters on
a YES or NO basis. Central panel directors report that
their ALJs are evaluated annually with a focus on how to
improve judicial performance.
 Proponents also note that while the administrative process
has important implications for the business community, it
has an increasingly important role in matters involving the
welfare safety net: cases involving food stamp eligibility
determinations, Medicaid eligibility, eligibility for statefunded home health services, matters involving long-term
care facilities certification, child support matters, hearings
involving child and family state services, etc.

20
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Some legal aid lawyers have expressed the hope that
independent, well-trained ALJs will provide more
objective, higher-quality adjudication to their low-income
clients. Equally as important, some lawyers have
expressed their view that highly trained, independent
ALJs will be of benefit to pro se litigants by providing a
less adversarial, more efficient system of adjudication
designed to make proceedings more fair, effective, and
efficient for those without legal representation.
X. INSIGHTS INTO THE CENTRAL PANEL APPROACH
A. Fairness and Due Process
Proponents of central panel systems contend that separating the
adjudication process from the agencies that have an interest in the
outcome of a case enhances fairness and minimizes the appearance of
impropriety and bias. Directors we interviewed often commented that
the central panel system enhances public confidence in the system
because ALJs are independent of the agencies.21
In interviews we conducted with legal aid lawyers whose clients
appear before the “safety net” agencies, we have heard that they and
their clients are often subject to a system that is “stacked against
them.” Some see an independent ALJ as the safety valve for
fairness.22
Illinois Administrative Law Judge Edward Schoenbaum, a leader
of the central panel movement, stated, “many people believe that
[ALJs] who are not in a central hearing agency are biased in their
adjudicative responsibilities ... [because the] ALJs are hired,

Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing
System, Executive Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance), Allen
C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings, Former Director),
Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative
Law Judge), Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, former
General Counsel). However, most conclusions about the fairness of central panel
systems are derived from anecdotal, interview-based evidence, and the results of
litigant surveys conducted by many central panels.
22 Interviews with individual legal aid lawyers.
21
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promoted, supervised, and paid by the very agency for whom [they]
are [reviewing]... [t]he public thinks this is unfair.”23
Further, Ann Wise, former Director of the Louisiana Division of
Administrative Law, holds fairness as one of the greatest
justifications for implementing a central panel system, stating, “it is
not fair to combine into one person or political entity all of these
powers: to investigate (like police), to decide whether to bring
charges (like grand juries), to prosecute (like district attorneys), and
to decide guilt or innocence (like judges or juries).”24
Central panels allow litigants challenging an agency decision to
appear before a judge who is not also their adversary. Instead, such
persons have the opportunity to appear before an ALJ that is
independent from the agency at the heart of the dispute and receive
an arguably unbiased review and decision.25 Many central panel
directors have remarked based on their anecdotal experience that
central panels produce more fair outcomes.26 But commentators
report that some ALJs on central panels have expressed the view that
they sometimes feel at least some continued pressure to rule in favor
of agencies, particularly in systems where the panel is funded by the
agencies.27 But such blatant interference appears uncommon.28
However, some central panel systems are funded by charging the
agencies for their costs and services at a billable rate.29 Some central
panel systems, like Wisconsin and Michigan, seek to build
safeguards into this process through a “Memorandum of
Understanding” (MOU), which governs the relationship and funding

Interview with Judge Edward Schoenbaum.
Wise, Louisiana's Division of Administrative LALJ: An Independent
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. National Association of Administrative
Law Judges 95, 96 (2010).
25 Interviews with central panel directors.
26 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
27 Hon. W. Michael Gillette, ALJ Central Panels: How is it Going Out There?,
The Judicial Edge (2015).
28 Id.
29 Interviews with central panel directors.
23
24
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arrangement between the central panel and each agency.30 Operating
under such a MOU, however, requires significant administrative
effort on an annual basis in order to negotiate the MOU with each
agency and attempt to forecast the cost per case for that upcoming
year.31 It is also reported to be difficult to resolve billing disputes that
may arise with the agencies during the year.32
Many central panel directors have remarked that funding plays an
essential role in ensuring fairness. The vast majority believe that the
best method of funding is an allocation from the state’s general
assembly.33 This approach provides a source of funding independent
of the agencies served by the central panel and allows for more
independent operations by the central panel agency.
Creating an advisory council to give direction, policy counsel,
and advice on the adoption of rules established by the central panel
may be another way to increase fairness. For example, Maryland
created the State Advisory Council on Administrative Hearings,
which advises the chief administrative law judge.34 The Council also
identifies issues that the administrative law judges should address
and reviews matters relating to administrative hearings, the
administrative process, and policies and regulations proposed by the
chief ALJ.35
In addition, at the advice of its State Advisory Council for
Administrative Hearings, the North Dakota Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH) decided early on not to aggressively seek to include
Based on interviews with Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of Hearings and
Appeals, Division Administrator) and Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative
Hearing System, Executive Director).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator), Chris S eppanen (Michigan
Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County
Department of Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
34 Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings Origins & Functions,
Maryland.gov, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/01adminf.html.
35 Id.
30
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agencies within its jurisdiction, but rather to encourage agencies to
voluntarily use OAH.36 It should be noted, however, that other
central panel systems found it advantageous to work diligently to
include as many case types and agencies as possible from the panel’s
inception.37
An issue that straddles the notions of fairness, independence, and
accountability is evaluation of ALJ performance. Opponents of any
type of evaluation of ALJs look to general jurisdiction judges as
examples. According to this view, other judges are not evaluated
formally on a regular basis because they must enjoy absolute
independence if the judicial system is to remain impartial. But
general jurisdiction judges in many states are subject to retention
election through which voters must vote affirmatively to allow these
individuals to maintain their judicial seats. Proponents of evaluation
claim that the public is owed a system that is transparent and
accountable—one that includes a system that identifies areas of
weakness for each administrative law judge and makes
recommendations for improvements.
B. Efficiency
Central panels are credited with fostering better allocation of state
agency resources and producing greater efficiency in administrative
adjudication.38 They are also credited with producing more
36 Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 239 (2001).
37 Based on interviews with Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator); Chris Seppanen (Michigan
Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director).
38 Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 , J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 57 (2003) (detailing the increased efficiency effectuated by
adopting a central panel in Oregon); James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the
State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 1355, 1383 (2002)
(noting that central panels often render better decisions than those adjudicators
employed by a single agency); Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences
Between Judges in the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch: The Further
Evolution of Executive Adjudication Under the Administrative Central Panel, 18 ,
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (1998) (advocating for the adoption of
central panel systems for administrative adjudication); Karen Y. Kauper, Note,
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systematic and uniform agency decision-making.39 Central panel
directors commented that increased efficiency is "one of the most
underrated benefits of the system.”40
The Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings, for example,
prides itself on issuing a decision on every hearing in ninety days or
less.41 Michigan eliminated thousands of administrative rules to
create a uniform set of rules governing all administrative cases.42 One
goal of this effort was to make the process more clear and predictable
to the parties.43 New York City similarly recommended that its
central panel create its own standard rules and procedures, rather than
adopting the multiple sets of rules and procedures utilized by each of
the different agencies.44 Centralizing the process by placing ALJs and
associated staff under one umbrella also reduces the overall costs
associated with hearing cases and, generally, more cases can be heard
by fewer ALJs.45 Several directors also credit the central panel
system with clearing case backlogs, since the central panel has more
flexibility to add ALJs in certain subject areas when those areas
experience a higher volume of cases.46
There is some concern, however, that too much focus on
efficiency may create problems—specifically in regard to the

Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model
Administrative Law Judges Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 537, 543
(1985) (applauding the benefits of the central panel paradigm).
39 Interviews with central panel directors.
40 Id.
41
The
Office
of
Administrative
Hearings,
Maryland.gov,
http://www.oah.state.md.us/.
42 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing
System, Executive Director).
43 Id.
44 Based on interview with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
45 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge) and Chris
Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing System, Executive Director).
46 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Samuel P.
Langholz (former Chief Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa
Administrative Hearings Division), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
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imposition of quotas. A study of the Virginia Social Security ALJs
found that:
[T]he requirement to schedule 40 cases per month, on
average, is not reasonably attainable, nor is it
reasonable to expect ALJs to achieve 500–700 case
dispositions annually while also complying with SSA
directives on legally sufficient decisions. Obviously,
opinions could vary about how challenging
“reasonably attainable” goals should be, and some
might prefer more or less stringent challenges.47
The Chief ALJ of the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings commented that while the Florida legislature has statutory
mandates for certain cases to be resolved in a certain timeframe, he
also has a collaborative relationship with the legislature allowing him
to offer input on the feasibility of such standards.48 In addition, these
timeframes have been amended and revised over time to fit the
current realities of the panel.49
Such flexibility and open communication between the panel and
the legislature has ensured that the panel hears cases efficiently and
in a timely manner while also ensuring that ALJs allocate the
appropriate time to each case—allowing extensions in the interest of
due process where necessary.50 Thus, consultation of ALJs before
setting quotas and the willingness to be flexible in adjusting such
standards appears to go a long way to prevent the aforementioned
issues.51
47 Administrative Law Judge Work Analysis Study, Human Resources
Research
Organization
(2015),
vi,
https://drive.google.com/a/jd16.lALJ.harvard.edu/file/d/0B2kAAfgH45ClZjRGejd
wSkwyNXc/vie w?p li=l.
48 Based on interview with Robert Cohen (Florida State Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Based on interviews with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Samuel P.
Langholz (former Chief Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa
Administrative Hearings Division), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
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C. Cost Reduction
Proponents of a centralized administrative system argue it results
in reduced costs due to economies of scale and flexibility. The
benefits of economies of scale are most apparent for agencies that
have high- volume hearing needs, such as a thousand or more annual
referrals.52
A hearing officer issuing 1,000 orders a month can do so more
efficiently than one issuing 100, for example, because of shared
resources such as case management systems, operational staff,
vehicles, office space, etc.53 In addition, a larger hearing office has
the capacity to absorb a greater amount of additional work than a
smaller office.54
The benefits of flexibility in case assignment are most visible for
agencies with low-volume hearing needs (a few hundred referrals a
year).55 A centralized system allows a chief ALJ to assign ALJs a
variety of cases with different subject matters depending on the
ALJ’s expertise.56 “The resulting flexibility in case assignments bore
fruit in reductions of redundant staff, monetary cost savings, or both
in Colorado, New Jersey, Texas, and Minnesota."57
An indication of the savings that may be anticipated by the
institution of a central hearing panel is supplied by Oregon’s
experience, which first showed a fiscal impact in FY 2000–01. There
were cost reductions in hours per case referral (down 17 percent),
cost per referral (down 11 percent), cost of Department of
Transportation referrals (down six percent, saving $37 million) and
cost of Department of Human Services referrals (down 23 percent).58

52 John Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to
Critics, 24 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 231, 233 (2004).
53 Id. at 234.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 233.
56 Id. at 233–34.
57 Id. at 236–37.
58 Id. at 234.
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D. Hiring, Training, and Supervision
Central panel directors appear to place an emphasis on hiring and
the need to select highly qualified applicants to fill ALJ positions.
This includes applicants who have practiced law for a number of
years and have prior experience handling cases before an
administrative court or other trial experience.59 The basic idea is that
hiring highly qualified lawyers as ALJs will enhance fairness,
efficiency, and the overall quality of administrative hearings for all
parties involved.
Many proponents of central panels suggest that newly hired ALJs
should receive further training by virtue of the work they perform
under the central panel system. For example, the former Chief ALJ of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board argued that the central panel
structure “will place the management and training of all ALJs in the
hands of experienced officials whose understanding and appreciation
of the duties and responsibilities of the office come from their actual
performance of such duties and responsibilities.”60 Many central
panel directors reported sending new hires to the 4-hour National
Judicial College training in Reno, complying with the required CLE
training requirements for all lawyers, as well as conducting an annual
training in addition to informal on- the-job training.61
In California, new ALJs complete a year-long probation and
mentoring program, which includes conducting mock hearings and

59 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge).
60 Gerald E. Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory Process: An
Emerging Framework to Increase "Judicialization" in Pennsylvania, J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 245 (1996).
61 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator); Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division
of Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel).
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issuing practice decisions under the observation and review of an
ALJ mentor. Before issuing their first decisions, new ALJs’ opinions
are reviewed by both their mentor and a more senior ALJ.62
Many states provide only limited ALJ supervision after the initial
training period, if any. For example, ALJs often issue their own
decisions without any kind of evaluation prior to issuance.63 In other
states, the director observes hearings conducted by new ALJs and
then provides feedback on the hearing and written decision.64
E. Generalist v. Specialist ALJs
An important consideration for states implementing a central
panel system is whether the panel will consist of specialist ALJs, who
hear certain case topics exclusively or almost exclusively, or
generalist ALJs, who hear a variety of cases.
The generalist system can combat ALJ insularity and
complacency as well as the appearance of ALJ bias in favor of the
agency, since ALJs work on a variety of cases originating from
different agencies.65 Further, a generalist system allows central panel
directors more flexibility to assign ALJs to different depending on
caseloads, thereby reducing costs and increasing the speed with
which cases are heard.66
Directors commented that ALJs prefer the generalist system with
a more diversified caseload over hearing the same type of case over
Based on interview with Alicia Boomer (California Office of Administrative
Hearings, Senior Counsel).
63 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance); Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief
Administrative Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings
Division).
64 Based on interview with Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
65 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance) and J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of State, Chief
Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division).
66 Based on interview with Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of Hearings and
Appeals, Division Administrator).
62
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and over;67 however, some cases require highly technical expertise,
which can be difficult for ALJs to acquire across several different
areas of law.68 One director described the question of whether to
make ALJs generalist or specialists as a “constant tension.”69
Interviews and surveys with ALJs indicate a strong relationship
between hearing more than one type of case and job satisfaction.
In order to capture the benefits from both the specialist and
generalist system, some states opt for a hybrid system where
specialized ALJs hear more complicated or technical cases and other
ALJs hear a variety of different cases.70
States can consider placing ALJs in tiers based on their
experience to most effectively capture the benefits of both the
generalist and specialist systems. Based on our interviews, such a
promotional system would likely incentivize ALJs to work hard and
increase their knowledge base in order to earn the promotion to a
higher tier.71 Additionally, this system would afford central panel
directors the ability to maintain staffing flexibility by assigning
higher- tiered ALJs to adjudicate cases along with lower-tiered ALJs
during periods of increased caseloads.72 The hybrid system could also
67 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance) and J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of State, Chief
Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division).
68 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance).
69 Based on interview with Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief Administrative
Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings Division).
70 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance), Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings,
Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative
Law Judge).
71 It is important for such a hybrid system to have the flexibility to absorb
ALJs into higher tiers when they meet certain benchmarks for advancement, rather
than when there is an opening at the higher tier. One central panel director
commented that morale problems are created when ALJs work to gain the
knowledge and experience to advance to a higher tier but have to wait for a
vacancy.
72 Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
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combat ALJ complacency and the appearance of ALJ bias in favor of
an agency, since higher-tiered ALJs can be assigned to lower-tiered
cases in addition to adjudicating a variety of specialized cases.
XI. INDEPENDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
Administrative law judge independence has always been at the
heart of arguments by proponents of the central panel. Final decisionmaking authority, as opposed to recommendations subject to agency
review, is one means through which ALJ independence can be
effectuated. Many central panel directors have commented that while
administrative law judges’ opinions are often recommended
decisions subject to agency review, the ALJs are empowered with the
ability to create the record and make findings of fact, which is not
subject to review or disturbed on review.73 Others noted that most
recommendations become final. States adopting a central panel
system must make this choice, and there is much division on which
alternative produces the fairest outcome.74
Before central panels, administrative adjudication was clearly the
province of the agency. The contested case took place at the agency,
and fact-finding done by the ALJ was just a preliminary step to the
agencies rendering the final decision. ALJs were considered to be
employees of the agency, there only to provide aid via a fact-finding
function to facilitate agency decision-making.
But the creation of the central panels transferred the focus of
adjudication from the final agency decision to the decision- making
by the ALJ. Legislatures that have provided for this change have
Assurance) and Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing System,
Executive Director).
73 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings, Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Brian Hayes (Wisconsin Division of
Hearings and Appeals, Division Administrator), Tammy L. Pust (Minnesota Office
of Administrative Hearings, Chief Judge).
74 Flanagan, supra note 38; James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005); Final,
But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
53, 57 n.6 (2004).
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been persuaded to do so in light of the hiring process, nonpartisan
supervision, training, and overall independence of the central panel
ALJ.
In addition, giving final decision authority to central panel ALJs
has a financial edge. ALJ finality allows a step in the process—
agency review—to be skipped, thereby providing for cost savings.
Proponents of final decision authority view judicial review as a
source of accountability within the system.
To proponents, giving ALJs final decision authority combines the
recognition that central panel ALJs are highly trained, wellsupervised administrative jurists with the benefits of cost savings
provided by eliminating a major step in the process.
But opponents look to the role of the administrative agency as the
reason to oppose central panel ALJ final decision authority. In their
view, agencies need that final power in order to maintain policy
consistency. In contrast, proponents state that agencies can set forth
their policy positions through rulemaking and that lawyers for the
agency during administrative hearings are free to argue their claims
based on policy set forth by the administrative agency.
Proponents of central panel ALJ final decision authority also
point to the potential abuse of power that could occur should
agencies seek to overturn every central panel ALJ decision adverse to
the agency. This would allow agencies to not only second-guess ALJ
decisions applying policy to facts but to second-guess the factfinding of the ALJ as well.
This protection from agency abuse is particularly pronounced in
the increasing number of administrative law cases involving pro se
litigants. These individuals, lacking legal representation, need the
protection of an independent administrative process perhaps even
more than cases in which parties are represented by legal counsel.
This is one of the reasons why some legal aid lawyers to whom we
spoke see the central panel as a protector of individual rights.
Central panels have proven themselves to be laboratories of new
ideas to provide administrative adjudication that is fair, efficient, and
independent. As final decision authority for ALJs is debated on an
ongoing basis, we have seen a hybrid approach being employed
among existing central panels.
There is a growing trend of legislatures providing for final
decision authority to central panel ALJs in at least some matters.
Georgia is the latest state legislature to do so. Agency personnel to
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whom we spoke were much less opposed to final decision authority
in cases where the adjudication has to do primarily with fact-finding
and applying statutory law and conditions to the established set of
facts. In more controversial, more complex cases involving legal
representation for both parties, agencies are much less likely to want
to give up control over review of the central panel ALJ decisionmaking.
What has occurred in a variety of states and municipalities is that
as central panels become more accepted into the framework of
administrative adjudication as independent, high-quality, well-trained
adjudicators, opposition to final authority subsides. In fact, this
process of acceptance has led to a phenomenal growth in the number
of central panels as well as the jurisdictions covered by each.
In general, there appears to be a spectrum of ALJ decisionmaking authority and processes. For some central panel systems,
decision-making authority is determined by the agency. In
Wisconsin, the agency identifies whether they want a final or
proposed decision at the time they provide the hearing order to the
panel.75 In other states, like Maryland and North Dakota, the state
legislature plays a role in determining whether ALJ decisions are
final or recommendations.76 In New York City, ALJs only render
recommendations; none of their decisions are final.77 Colorado ALJs
have no other final decision-making authority beyond Secretary of
State election disputes.78 In contrast, in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Louisiana, the vast majority of decisions rendered by
the ALJs are final.79 Florida ALJs have final decision-making
75

Id.
Based on interviews with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance); Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings,
Former Director).
77 Based on interview with Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
78 Based on interviews with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado
Administrative Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
79 Based on interviews with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge); Cynthia Eyre
(Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel).
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authority over most cases in their jurisdiction, excluding professional
licensure cases and school board cases.80
The ALJs for the Cook County Parking Ticket Hearing Officer
System only issue final decisions.81 This specific central panel
system was built on this concept from its inception, based on a
perspective that permitting an agency director to overturn a judge’s
decision diminishes the value of the judge and the purpose of the
process to create efficiency, fairness, and cost savings.82
In Tennessee, most agencies request that the ALJs render “initial
orders” subject to review by the agency director. If the initial order is
not appealed within fifteen days, it becomes a final order.83
Approximately 80–90% of the initial orders in Tennessee eventually
become final orders.84 In Iowa, ALJs generally issue
recommendations, at which time the parties always have a right of
appeal directly to the agency, thereby permitting the agency to
modify or overturn the ALJ’s decision.85
Opponents of ALJ finality argue that agencies have greater
knowledge and more expertise in the subject matters before the ALJs,
and as such are the more-appropriate final decision makers.86 The
general concern is the inconsistencies that may arise from ALJ
finality if the agencies and ALJs are using different policy
approaches.87
Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice and law professor Frank
Sullivan Jr., remarked:

Based on interview with Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
81 Based on interview with John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
82 Id.
83 Based on interview with J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee Secretary of
State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures Division).
84 Id.
85 Based on interview with Samuel P. Langholz (former Chief Administrative
Law Judge and Administrator, Iowa Administrative Hearings Division).
86 James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ
Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 419 (2005).
87 Id.
80

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34

39-1

We have seen already that removing policy
considerations from administrative adjudications strips
those decisions of the separation of powers
justification for deference: they are no longer the
decisions of the entity under the Constitution with
primacy for executing policy on that subject. Indeed,
does the exhaustion doctrine—that a party must
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review—have the same vitality under central
panels if there is a non-deferential standard of review?
Without a deferential standard of review, I think the
very legitimacy conferred on administrative law judge
decisions by virtue of those judges being accountable
within the executive branch is arguably removed.88
Further, there are some cases where even proponents of finality in
ALJ decision-making agree that the agency should have final
decision-making authority. For example, where the agency at issue is
an elected board or commission, allowing the ALJ final decisionmaking authority would usurp the authority of officials chosen by the
electorate specifically to make such decisions.89
Central panel directors have differing opinions on this topic.
Some agree that agencies have greater expertise and therefore should
have final decision authority.90 In response, proponents of finality in
ALJ decisions argue that these decisions are still appealable and
reviewable by a court. In addition, agencies or legislatures could
consider reserving recommended decisions to only those specialized
areas where level of ALJ expertise is a particular concern. Other
proponents have argued that vesting final decision-making authority

Frank Sullivan, Jr., Some Questions to Consider Before Indiana Creates a
Centralized Office of Administrative Hearings, IND. L. REV. 397 (2005).
89 Based on interviews with Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director) and Robert Cohen (Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
90 Based on interviews with Judge Larry Craddock (Texas State Office of
Administrative Hearings), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative
Hearings Office, Senior ALJ), Robert Cohen (Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
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in the ALJ results in cost savings and greater efficiency and fairness
for litigants, as it eliminates a step in the process—allowing litigants
to go from an administrative trial directly to the appeal, thereby
streamlining and simplifying the process.91
Permitting ALJ finality and removing agency review also
minimizes the perception of impropriety by not permitting an agency
to appeal or overturn an unfavorable decision. Indeed, in North
Dakota, from time to time where the ALJ’s decision is not final,
agencies ask the ALJ to make final decisions in difficult or
controversial cases in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
One chief ALJ commented that a drawback of giving ALJs such
authority could be heightened scrutiny of the panel by the agency
when the ALJ renders unfavorable decisions.92 While a consensus
has not been issued on the question of ALJ finality, opponents and
proponents seem to agree that agency policy should always be the
cornerstone of decision-making.
Finally, there may be cost savings that accrue to final decisionmaking authority. In cases where ALJs have such authority, agencies
and litigants do not have to expend time and money on a secondstage adjudication.
A. A Legislative Case Study in Imposing Final Decision-Making
Authority: Georgia
On May 8, 2018, the governor of the state of Georgia signed
House Bill 790 (H.B. 790) into law. The purpose of H.B. 790 was to
implement various legal and systemic changes recommended by the
state’s Court Reform Council to streamline the state administrative
hearing process and increase the public’s perception of fairness in the
judicial system. We detail the ways in which H.B. 790 has altered the
landscape of administrative law within the state of Georgia, with a
focus on the newly enhanced power of ALJs to issue final decisions
in “contested cases." In an effort to facilitate a full understanding of
the impact of the recently enacted legislation, the first section will

Based on interview with Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
92 Based on interview with Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings
Office, Senior ALJ).
91
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describe the system of administrative hearings in place before H.B.
790 was enacted, while the second section will explore the changes to
the system that the new law has imposed and their anticipated impact.
1. The Administrative Hearing System Before H.B. 790’s Enactment
The Office of State Administrative Hearings (OSAH) was formed
by the Georgia General Assembly in 1994 “as a new state agency.”93
OSAH is situated within the state’s executive branch and is charged
with “impartial administration of administrative hearings in
accordance with the” Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.94 By
law, OSAH must remain independent of other state administrative
agencies.95 OSAH is headed by a chief ALJ, who is appointed by the
governor for a renewable six-year term and is tasked with
administering OSAH.96 The chief ALJ’s duties include the
promulgation of rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for
OSAH to carry out its duties97 and the appointment of all of OSAH
ALJs.98 As of 2017, OSAH employs thirteen full-time ALJs, not
including the chief ALJ.99
OSAH’s operations are predicated on the referral of contested
cases from state administrative agencies. “Whenever a state agency
authorized by law to determine contested cases100 initiates or receives
a request for a hearing in a contested case which is not presided over
by the agency . . . ultimate decision maker, the hearing shall be

Mark A. Dickerson, The Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings,
19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 121, 121 (1999).
94 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-40(a) (2017).
95 Id.
96 See id. at (b)–(e).
97 Id. at (c).
98 Id. at (e).
99 Meet Us: Judges, GEORGIA OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,
https://osah.ga.gov/meetus-judges/.
100 The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Georgia APA) defines a
contested case as “a proceeding, including, but not restricted to, rate making, price
fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are
required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.”
O.G.C.A. § 50-13-2(2) (2017).
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conducted by” OSAH.101 It is important to note that prior to the
promulgation of H.B. 790, agencies could hold onto hearing requests
indefinitely, without referral, because there was no mandated time by
which agencies were required to refer a request to OSAH for hearing.
Despite the lack of time constraints on agency referral prior to the
enactment of H.B. 790, in 2016, upwards of 50,000 cases were
referred to and resolved by OSAH,102 while in 2017, OSAH resolved
more than 41,000 cases.103
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 790, the general rule regarding
ALJ resolution of contested cases indicated that any ALJ decision
regarding such a case was to be treated merely as an “initial
decision.”104 Both before and after H.B. 790’s promulgation, any
“initial decision” rendered by an ALJ is open to review within thirty
days following its issuance, either upon the request of a party to the
contested case or upon the relevant agency’s own initiative.105 If
agency review is pursued, any decision rendered by the reviewing
agency becomes a final decision.106

O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(a)(1) (2017).
Survey of central panels conducted by the Louisiana Division of
Administrative Law. This central panel agency issues on an annual basis
demographic information on state-based central panels.
103 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT: COURT
REFORM COUNCIL 8 (Nov. 20, 2017).
104 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in this article, in all
cases every decision of an administrative law judge shall be treated as an initial
decision...”).
105 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(a) (2017) (“[I]n the absence of an application to
the agency within 30 days from the date of notice of the initial decision for review,
or an order by the agency within such time for review on its motion, the initial
decision shall, without further proceedings become the decision of the agency.”).
Note, when as agency reviews an ALJ initial decision, either upon the request of a
party to the contested case or upon an agency’s own initiative, “the agency shall
have all powers it would have in making the initial decision;” O.C.G.A. § 50-1317(a) (2017); but must “give due regard to the [ALJ’s] opportunity to observe
witnesses[such that, if] the reviewing agency rejects or modifies a proposed finding
of fact or a proposed decision, it shall give reasons for doing so in writing in the
form of findings of fact and conclusions of law.” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(d) (2017).
106 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(e)(1) (2017) (“A reviewing agency shall have a
period of 30 days following the entry of the decision of the administrative law
judge to reject or modify such decision.”); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17(c) (2017) (“Each
101
102
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Where a party to the contested case seeks to challenge this final
decision, they are entitled to judicial review.107 In contrast, if an
ALJ’s initial decision is not reviewed by an agency within thirty days
of its rendition, it becomes a final decision.108 Both the Georgia case
law and Georgia APA indicate that a party may not bypass agency
review of an “initial decision” by seeking judicial review within the
thirty-day period following an ALJ’s issuance of an “initial
decision.”109 To do so would violate the principle of exhaustion,
which is memorialized in the Georgia APA and asserts that,
generally, a party may not seek judicial review of agency action
unless they have exhausted all administrative remedies.110 Hence, in
many respects, the statutory default rule in place prior to H.B. 790
left ALJs without meaningful decision-making power because a party
was required to take advantage of the two-tier system of review
before they could seek outside judicial review.
However, the Georgia statutes provided one important exception
to this pre-H.B. 790 default rule: “[a]ny agency may provide by rule
that proposed decisions in all or in specified classes of cases before

agency shall render a final decision in contested cases within 30 days after” an ALJ
has rendered its initial decision).
107 O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(a) (2017). Note, if judicial review of the agency’s
final decision is sought, the reviewing court is precluded from substituting its own
“judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact.” O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2017).
108 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(e)(1) (2017) (“If a reviewing agency fails to reject
or modify the decision of the administrative law judge within such 30 day period,
then the decision of the administrative law judge shall stand affirmed by the
reviewing agency by operation of law.”).
109 See Department of Pub. Safety v. MacLafferty, 195 S.E.2d 748, 750 (Ga.
1973) (“The Department contends that agency review [of an ALJ’s initial decision]
provided in the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act is a necessary step in the
exhaustion of administrative remedies required by the act as a prerequisite to
judicial review...We agree.”).
110 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2017) (“Any person who has exhausted all
administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.”)
(emphasis added); Carnes v. Crawford, 272 S.E.2d 690, 691 (Ga. 1980) (“[U]nder
the APA exhaustion of administrative remedies available within the agency is
necessary for judicial review of a final decision in a contested case, and an
aggrieved person who fails to seek review by the agency of an initial decision of a
hearing officer has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.”).
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the Office of State Administrative Hearings will become final
without further agency action and without expiration of the 30-day
review period otherwise provided for in this subsection.”111 Hence,
agencies could voluntarily opt to delegate final decision-making
authority to ALJs reviewing contested cases, thereby allowing parties
to the case to circumvent the generally required second tier of agency
review by applying directly for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
As of 2017, multiple agencies with significant caseloads had availed
themselves of this exception, opting to grant ALJs final decisionmaking authority.112
Among these agencies are the Department of Driver Services and
the Department of Public Safety, which referred almost 13,000 cases
to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year, and the Department of Human
Services and Office of Child Support Services, which referred almost
9,000 cases to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year.113 Hence, despite the
default rule, ALJs exercised valid final decision-making authority in
65% of all cases referred to OSAH in the 2017 fiscal year—almost
27,000 contested cases.114
Another important hindrance to the power and efficacy of ALJs
before the enactment of H.B. 790 was their reliance on courts to
sanction parties to the contested case and enforce subpoenas they had
issued. Though ALJs were statutorily empowered to “sign and issue
subpoenas,”115 if the party subpoenaed failed to comply the issuing
ALJ could not simply enforce the subpoena but was forced to rely on
a superior court to do so on its behalf.116 A party to the contested case
could seek to enforce the subpoena as well but was also obligated to
seek enforcement through the superior court.117 Additionally, where a
party, or their agent, otherwise failed to comply with the ALJ’s
requests or the general hearing process, an ALJ did not have the
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(e)(3) (2017).
STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 7–9.
113 Id. at 7.
114 Id. at 8–9.
115 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(a)(2) (2017) (“An administrative law judge shall
have the power to do all things specified in paragraph (6) of subsection (a) of Code
Section 50-13-13.”); O.C.G.A. § 50- 13-13(a)(6) (2017) (“[T]he hearing officer . . .
shall have authority to do the following: . . . sign and issue subpoenas”).
116 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(b) (2017).
117 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(7) (2017).
111
112
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authority to find the party in contempt and take appropriate action
thereafter but, instead, was statutorily forced to rely upon the court to
make such a finding.118
“In proceedings before . . . the hearing officer . . . if
any party . . . disobeys or resists any lawful order of
process; or neglects to produce, after having been
ordered to do so, any pertinent book, paper, or
document; . . . or, upon appearing, refuses to take the
oath or affirmation as a witness; or, taking the oath or
affirmation, refuses to testify . . . [the] hearing officer .
. . may certify the facts to the superior court of the
county where the offense is committed for appropriate
action, including a finding of contempt.”119
Thus, in many respects, ALJs were reliant on the courts to
enforce order in OSAH hearings, a framework of authority that
results in significant inefficiency, requiring reliance on a superior
court and delaying the overall hearing process.120
On March 30, 2017, the Governor of the state of Georgia
established the Court Reform Council (Council) by executive order
for the purpose of reviewing “current practices and procedures within
the judicial court system and the administrative law hearing system
and mak[ing] recommendations to improve efficiencies and achieve
best practices for the administration of justice.”121 Key stakeholders
were appointed to the Council, including the state’s attorney general
as well as the chief ALJ, the latter of which had long advocated for
ALJ final decision-making authority and other reforms to the APA
and OSAH hearing process that would improve efficiency.122
In November 2017, the Council issued its Final Report, which
contained several recommendations for changes to the administrative

See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(b) (2017).
Id.
120 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 11.
121
Ga.
Exec
Order
No.
03.30.17.01
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/03.30.17
.01.pdf.
122 See id.
118
119
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hearing process.123 H.B. 790 was greatly informed by this Final
Report and enacts the recommendations made by the Council’s
Administrative Procedure Act Subcommittee.124 Discussing H.B. 790
in a phone interview with Michael Malihi, the current chief ALJ, he
disclosed that opposition to the Bill by government players and the
public was virtually nonexistent.125 In fact, the Bill enjoyed wide
support across party lines—in the House, the Bill was unopposed,
while in the Senate only one party voted against passage.126 Mr.
Malihi attributed this bipartisan support to the fact that the Bill’s
proposed changes were viewed as a matter of fairness and justice,
and therefore appealed to persons from across the political spectrum.
2. The Administrative Hearing System After H.B. 790’s Enactment

STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103.
See Ga. H.B. 790, Synopsis (2018).
125 In the conversation, Mr. Malihi emphasized the importance of the inclusion
of key stakeholders in the reform effort. He indicated that he had long discussed
administrative reform within Georgia with Governor Deal, one of the many factors
that catalyzed the Governor’s creation of the Council. Mr. Malihi stressed that a
large portion of the reform’s success and wide acceptance was due to the
Governor’s choice to appoint powerful state players, such as the attorney general,
as well as key stakeholders, such as house and senate leaders, to membership in the
Council. See Court Reform Council – Members, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL CHRIS CARR, https://law.georgia.gov/court-reform-council-members
(last visited June 20, 2018) (listing the final membership of the Court Reform
Council); Ga. Exec Order No. 03.30.17.01 (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/03.30.17
.01.pdf containing the original list of members appointed to the Court Reform
Council). Ultimately, this strategy allowed crucial actors to deliberate about the
system’s faults and come to a learned remedy, influenced by the needs of Georgia
and the reform experiences of other states. Moreover, the inclusion of powerful
actors gave the reform effort credibility while simultaneously assuring that such
actors were involved in the recommendation process, thereby cementing their
incentive to implement and support implementation of their own recommendations.
126 2017-2018 Regular Session – HB 790, GEORGIA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
LEGISLATION,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/enUS/display/20172018/HB/790 (last visited June 18, 2018). In the same phone
conversation with Mr. Malihi, he disclosed that, to his knowledge, the single senate
vote against the bill was attributable to an error on the part of the voter, who was
confused about the voting process.
123
124
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The impact of H.B. 790 has been significant on the administrative
hearing process and the power of ALJs. The changes engendered by
the Bill can be grouped into three main categories: increased final
decision-making authority of ALJs; introduction of a concrete time
by which agencies must refer hearing requests to OSAH; and
increased ALJ enforcement powers. Each of these changes is
explored below.
i. The Introduction of ALJ Default Final Decision-Making Authority
Chief among the changes memorialized in H.B. 790 is its
expansion of ALJ final decision- making authority. Though, before
the bill’s passage, a majority of cases referred to OSAH were in fact
decided by ALJs with final decision-making authority, this authority
did not exist by virtue of the ALJs’ own power but by the power
agencies vested in ALJs through voluntarily electing to authorize
ALJs to make such binding decisions. H.B. 790, however, functions
to vest ALJs with final decision-making authority by default such
that only in exceptional circumstances will the decisions of ALJs be
considered merely “initial decisions.”127 Hence, the new default rule
would generally eliminate the two-tier system of review because an
ALJ’s decision would be final, automatically entitling the parties to
seek judicial review upon the decision’s rendition.128
The exceptions to this new default rule are limited and fall
directly in line with the recommendations of the Council’s
Administrative
Procedure
Act
Subcommittee.
These
recommendations suggest that an exception should “be made for
cases referred by agencies that are (i) responsible for licensing and
supervising professionals, and which are comprised of members
selected by the governor for their expertise in their respective fields;
and (ii) [agencies that] were constitutionally created or are headed by
constitutional officers.”129 Thus, in the case that a referring agency is
Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(c) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (d) of
this Code section, every decision of an administrative law judge shall be a final
decision as set forth in subsection (b) of Code Section 50-13- 17.”).
128 See id.
129 STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 6. In an
interview with Mr. Malihi, he indicated that the exceptions were in part borne of
constitutional concerns and in part borne of pragmatism. The constitutional
127
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‘a constitutional board of commission; an elected constitutional
officer in the executive branch of this state; or a board, bureau,
commission, or other agency of the executive branch of . . . [the state
of Georgia] created for the purpose of licensing or otherwise
regulating or controlling any profession, business, or trade . . . [and
the] members thereof are appointed by the Governor it is termed a
“reviewing agency.”’130
Any decision an ALJ renders regarding a contested case referred
to OSAH by a reviewing agency is merely an initial decision.131
Hence, in such a situation, the two-tier decision- making process
remains, such that the agency may review the ALJ’s initial decision
and render a final decision thereon.132 Only after this final decision is
rendered, or the ALJ’s initial decision has been unchallenged for
thirty days following its rendition, will a party to the contested case
be deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies such that
they become entitled to judicial review.133 Note, however, that the
voluntary exception for agency delegation of final decision-making
authority still remains.134 Hence, even though an agency may fall
under the umbrella of “reviewing agency,” it can nonetheless
concerns arose regarding the grant of final decision- making authority to ALJs in
cases referred by agencies that were constitutionally created or headed by
constitutional officers.
The pragmatic concerns arose regarding those agencies charged with licensing
and supervising professionals, of which there were too many within the state to
simply accord ALJs final decision- making authority without significant
complication and possible agency opposition.
130 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(1) (2018). At the time of the Council’s Final
Report, it was estimated that this exception would encompass the “Professional
Licensing Boards Division; [the] Professional Standards Commission; [the] Real
Estate Appraisers and Real Estate Commission; [the] Department of Insurance;
[the] State Personnel Board; [the] Secretary of State, Elections Division; [the]
Secretary of State, Commissioner or Securities; [the] Peace Officer Standards and
Training Council; [the] Composite Medical Board; [the] Board of Medical
Examiners; [and the] Office of the Governor.” STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM
COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 6.
131 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(2) (2018) (“[I]n all contested cases referred by a
reviewing agency, every decision of an administrative law judge shall be treated as
an initial decision”).
132 See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(1),(2) (2018).
133 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19 (2017).
134 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(d)(5) (2018).
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voluntarily choose to delegate final decision-making authority to
ALJs with regards to some or all of the cases that it refers to OSAH.
This single reform alone, even allowing for the exceptions, will
have a tremendous impact on the efficiency of the administrative
system and the power of ALJs. In its final report, the Council
estimated that this reform would increase the percentage of ALJ final
decision-making in contested cases from 65% to 99.6% in a single
fiscal year.135 It is anticipated that H.B. 790’s effective consolidation
of the two-tier review system into a single tier will greatly increase
the efficiency of the administrative hearing process in Georgia.136
Not only does the new single-tier system have the potential to result
in faster proceedings—the Council estimates that the total duration of
the proceedings will be reduced by some thirty to sixty days—but
this increase in judicial economy will ease the burden on taxpayers
and “[r]educe the overall litigation costs for the parties.”137
Moreover, the single-tier system will increase the public’s perception
of justice in the administrative hearing process as a single tier of
review lends a stronger appearance of impartiality and finality to the
process.138
However, in its Final Report, the Council indicated that a possible
disadvantage to the new system would be the reduction in “agencies’
authority over decisions directly affecting them.”139 This is of
particular concern where a contested case requires that a decision
maker have some level of expertise in the field at issue.140 Whereas
“[a]gencies are staffed with experts in their respective fields” this is
not the case with OSAH and may give rise to problems when ALJ
resolution of a complex issue requires heightened knowledge.141
ii. The Introduction of Time Constraints on Agency Referral of
Hearing Requests

STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 8.
See id. at 7.
137 Id.
138 Id. (“Finality strengthens the appearance of impartiality, as an agency can
no longer overturn decisions issued by an impartial body.”)
139 Id. at 10.
140 See STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 10.
141 Id.
135
136
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Another means by which H.B. 790 has increased efficiency is its
imposition of time constraints on agency referral of hearing requests
to OSAH. As mentioned above, prior to H.B. 790 there was no time
by which an agency was required to refer an administrative hearing
request to OSAH.142 This had the potential to work great hardship on
parties seeking a hearing because, absent agency referral to OSAH, a
party could not directly petition OSAH for such a hearing. Indeed,
this resulted in significant time delays in resolution of contested cases
and even intentional agency failure to refer that resulted in hearing
requests being held indefinitely without any resolution of the
underlying contested case. As such, prior to H.B. 790’s enactment,
parties seeking an administrative hearing were at the whim of
agencies with regards to when their cases would be heard and even if
their cases would be heard at all.
The Council recognized this as a significant fault in the Georgia
administrative hearing system and recommended that the agencies be
bound to refer hearing requests to OSAH by a concrete time.143 H.B.
790 implemented this recommendation such that agencies that have
received “a request for a hearing in a contested case . . . [must]
forward such a request for a hearing to the Office of State
Administrative Hearings within a reasonable time not to exceed 30
days after receipt of such request.”144 Perhaps even more impactful
than this referral time limitation is the solution the legislation
provides when an agency has not complied with the newly
established referral period. “If an agency fails [to refer a hearing to
OSAH in accordance with the 30-day limitation] . . . the party
requesting the hearing may petition the Office of State
Administrative Hearings for an order permitting such party to file a
request for a hearing directly with the Office of State Administrative
Hearings.”145 Hence, this addition to the law is quite impactful, not
only requiring agency action by a certain point but also providing
persons with a simple solution that fulfills their needs if an agency
fails to comply.
Id. at 13.
Id.
144 Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(a)(1) (2018).
145 Id. (emphasis added).
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As with the case of the augmentation of ALJ final decisionmaking authority, the imposition of an OSAH referral deadline and
an attendant right to petition OSAH directly is anticipated to have
significant positive effects on the administrative hearing system. The
change is likely to increase the efficiency of the system as it will
“[reduce] any lag time between a party’s request for a hearing and
OSAH’s docketing of the case.”146 Moreover, the new time constraint
leaves parties seeking to avail themselves of the administrative
infrastructure with greater “certainty as to when their cases will be
received and docketed by OSAH for hearing.”147
In its Final Report, the Council indicated that one possible
disadvantage of this new time constraint is that it may negatively
impact an agency’s ability to resolve the request outside of the
hearing process.148 Before referring a hearing request to OSAH,
agencies often attempt to settle a case with the parties involved.149
Where an agency proceeds this way and has reached a potential
settlement, it must wait for internal boards or commissions to
approve the recommended settlement.150 Often, the meetings of these
internal bodies take place months apart, a cause for significant delay
in the resolution process.151 Thus, a statutory mandate that agencies
refer hearing requests to OSAH within thirty days of receipt clearly
does not comport with the timeline for agency settlement outside of
hearing.
However, H.B. 790’s enactment is not likely to significantly
impact this alternative resolution method because, where a requesting
party has gained the statutory right to petition OSAH directly, they
need not exercise this right immediately.152 If the agency
STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 13.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(b) (2017) (“Nothing in this article shall affect,
alter, or change the ability of the parties to reach informal disposition of a contested
case in accordance with paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-1313.”); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13(a)(4) (“Unless precluded by law, informal disposition
may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order,
or default”).
146
147
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communicates with the party and is transparent about the timeline for
settlement and settlement approval, there is a high likelihood that
requesting parties will refrain from petitioning OSAH in favor of
awaiting the resolution of a settlement. Where a party has so
refrained but is ultimately unsatisfied with the settlement procedure
or resolution, they are free to petition OSAH at any point during the
process or thereafter if thirty days has lapsed since their initial
hearing request.
iii. The Augmentation of ALJ Enforcement Authority
Another important impact of H.B. 790 is its augmentation of ALJ
enforcement authority where participants in a hearing fail to
cooperate. With the enactment of this legislation, ALJs are now able
to enforce subpoenas they have personally issued, without the need to
first seek the assistance of a superior court for enforcement.153
Moreover, ALJs are now statutorily empowered to impose civil
penalties . . . [for a person’s failure] to obey any lawful process or
order of the administrative law judge or any rule or regulation
promulgated under [the Georgia APA] . . . for any indecorous or
improper conduct committed in the presence of the administrative
law judge, or for submitting pleadings or papers for an improper
purpose or containing frivolous arguments that have no evidentiary
support.154
Where an ALJ has imposed such civil penalties, they may apply
to “the superior court of the county in which the violation is
committed . . . to enforce by proper proceedings any lawful process
or order of civil penalties of the administrative law judge.”155
As is the case with the other changes engendered by the passage
of H.B. 790, ALJs’ augmented enforcement authority is anticipated
to improve the efficiency of the administrative hearings process.
“Allowing for imposition of sanctions lessens the need for parties to
See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(b) (2018) (“Subpoenas shall be enforced pursuant
to subsection (a) of this code section); id. at Sec. 3(a) (“An administrative law
judge shall have the power to impose civil penalties pursuant to paragraph (3) of
this subsection for failing to obey any lawful process or order of the administrative
law judge or any rule or regulation promulgated under this article”).
154 See Ga. H.B. 790, Sec. 3(a)(2) (2018).
155 Id.
153
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seek action in superior courts [for enforcement] while their case is
ongoing.”156 Moreover, this increased power of ALJs is predicted to
discourage parties from seeking subpoenas for persons they know
will not appear or submitting improper pleadings, both of which are
calculated to delay the process, effectively functioning as
unauthorized continuances.157 Furthermore, it is likely this
augmented ALJ power will contribute to the perception that ALJs
have the jurisdiction to rule on contested cases and maintain order in
their hearings—further indication that ALJs are fair and impartial
arbiters of the law rather than agency rubberstamps or mere hearing
officers that hold no sway.
3. Conclusion
H.B. 790 has greatly impacted the landscape of the administrative
hearing process in the state of Georgia. The bill was a response to the
Court Reform Council’s Final Report—an effort to implement the
recommendations therein, themselves a product of learned
observation as well as collaboration and negotiation of key
stakeholders within the state. The recently enacted legislation’s
introduction of default ALJ final decision-making, time constraints
on agency referral of hearing requests, and augmented ALJ
enforcement authority is predicted by proponents to positively impact
the state’s administrative hearing process in two main ways. First, the
administrative hearing process is likely to become much more
efficient as the former two-tier contested case review process has
largely been disposed of, and ALJs no longer need to rely on superior
courts to issue civil penalties for non-cooperation by persons in
anticipation of and during hearings. Second, these changes are likely
to contribute to the perception that ALJs and the larger OSAH
hearing process are just and impartial, as the decisions of ALJs are,
generally, no longer subject to agency review, and ALJs are now
empowered to issue civil penalties—both an indication that ALJs are
more than simply agency rubber stamps or mere hearing officers.

156
157

STATE OF GEORGIA COURT REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 11.
See id.
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B. Addressing Agency Concerns with the Central Panel System
The vast majority of central panel systems have had to address
agency concerns relating to the creation or expansion of a central
panel system. The primary agency concerns were (a) loss of control
of the process and (b) loss of subject matter expertise.158 The
Michigan Administrative Hearing System (MAHS) overcame the
agency concern of loss of control through the creation of an MOU
setting forth the responsibilities of the referring agency and the
central panel, including how a hearing request would be processed,
approximately how long the process would take, etc.159 Other central
panel systems highlighted for the agencies the benefits of:
(a) case backlog removal;
(b) increased efficiency in process and quicker
adjudication of cases; and
(c) cost savings due to no longer needing a hearing
support staff, which was persuasive160 Many central
panel systems also agreed to hire agency ALJs.161
Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative
Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance), Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee
Secretary of State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures
Division), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, Chief
Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings Office,
Senior ALJ), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings,
Former Director) and Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ,
former General Counsel).
159 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing
System, Executive Director).
160 Based on interviews with John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of
Administrative LALJ, former General Counsel).
161 Based on interviews with John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings, Chief Administrative Law Judge).
158
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MAHS addressed the agencies and special interest groups’ concerns
of lack of expertise in technical, complex, or specialized subject
matters through further utilizing the MOU approach. More
specifically, pursuant to the MOU, MAHS and the agency agreed that
they would jointly agree on the ALJs assigned to those specialized
cases.162 Other central panel systems stressed to the agencies the
caliber of highly qualified individuals hired for the ALJ position.163
Some agencies ultimately opted to exempt from the central panel
system a certain subset of their hearings on highly technical or
specialized matters.164 Other agencies requested only proposed
decisions for those specialized cases, thereby retaining final decisionmaking authority.165
However, with time, the agencies become comfortable with the
compromises and utilization of the central panels.166 No state that has
adopted a central panel has returned to its previous practice. For a
further discussion about addressing agency concerns with the central
panel system, please see the results of the survey conducted with
central panel directors beginning on page 67 of this report.
XII. GROWTH IN THE CENTRAL PANEL MOVEMENT
162 Based on interview with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative Hearing
System, Executive Director).
163 Based on interview with John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director).
164 Based on interview with Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance).
165 Id.
166 Based on interviews with Chris Seppanen (Michigan Administrative
Hearing System, Executive Director), John Allen (Cook County Department of
Administrative Hearings, Former Director), Georgia S. Brady (Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings, Administrative law Judge, Deputy Director, Quality
Assurance), Fidel F. Del Valle (New York City Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings, Chief Administrative law Judge), J. Richard Collier (Office of Tennessee
Secretary of State, Chief Administrative Judge, Administrative Procedures
Division), Julian Mann (North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, Chief
Administrative law Judge), Ed Felter (Colorado Administrative Hearings Office,
Senior ALJ), Allen C. Hoberg (North Dakota Office of Administrative Hearings,
Former Director) and Cynthia Eyre (Louisiana Division of Administrative LALJ,
former General Counsel).
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Since 1983, the central panel movement has grown from seven
state central panels to more than 30 state and municipal panels. Some
are exceptionally large, while some remain small. But the trend leans
toward expansion in terms of the number of central panels, their
jurisdiction, and final decision authority being granted to central
panel ALJs. This growth can be attributed to a variety of reasons, but
the most commonly cited include the recognition that central panels
are free to hire experienced lawyers, provide them with substantial
initial and ongoing training, and provide impartial and constructive
evaluation of judicial performance as well as the perception that the
central panel can provide independent decision-making at lower cost.
Our interviews with central panel directors, ALJs, and
administrative agency representatives lead to the following
conclusions.
Proponents of the central panel approach argue that the
consumers of administrative adjudication appear to have accepted
central panel ALJs as impartial arbiters. The independence of the
central panels has led to improvements in the quality of hearings and
decisions as well as the consistency and uniformity of the
proceedings. The management and training of ALJs are perceived to
be in the hands of experienced officials. While the increase in the
number of new central panels has slowed since 2000, central panel
directors noted in our interviews that the number of agencies using
the services of the central panel has increased.
Central panel directors also note that since 2000, they have seen
within their central panel agencies the streamlining and improved
effectiveness of data management and technology. This includes
electronic submission, case management, videoconferencing to
conduct and record hearings, establishing and maintaining a database
of hearing decisions, and maintaining transparency through up-todate websites. Central panels have been responsible for producing
codes of ethics for ALJs, uniform rules of procedure, and the
enhanced use of alternative dispute resolution procedures.
XIII. SURVEY RESULTS: A DESCRIPTION OF THE CENTRAL PANEL
PHENOMENON
We conducted a survey of central panel directors (CPDs)
nationwide and received responses from twenty-five states. The
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majority of the questions were answered by twenty-three central
panel directors. The data below summarize the survey results.
Fairness and Due Process

Nearly half (11/23) of the central panel directors (CPDs)
surveyed said they regularly obtain feedback, but 52% (12/23) said
feedback is only provided occasionally or not at all. Directors in
several states that do request feedback noted that response rates are
low. In North Carolina the CPD has specifically charged the Deputy
Director with improving the return rate.
Hiring, Training, and Supervision
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Other recruitment sources cited included the state bar association
website and agency or state employment websites.

Many states have few specific requirements beyond a license to
practice law, though nearly half (10/23) specified that CPDs are
required to have substantial or extensive experience. Most (8/10) of
the states with experience requirements demand five or more years of
practice. A few states define specific areas of required experience
including administrative law and representing clients in both
administrative and judicial proceedings. Other requirements worth
noting include vetting by the governor’s office and an absence of
financial conflicts of interest.
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In nearly 2/3 (65%) of states, CPDs are appointed by the
governor (or mayor, in municipalities). Several states (6/23) involve
cabinet members in the selection and/or appointment process. In one
state, a judicial selection panel makes a recommendation to the
governor, while in another a vote is taken by the administrative law
judges (ALJs).

CPDs in 61% (14/23) of states have no term limits and/or serve at
the pleasure of their superior, while 39% (9/23) of states specify term
limits with lengths of four to six years.
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A unique approach to CPD review of ALJ decisions is conducted
in Alaska, where the CPD (Chief ALJ) and all the more senior ALJs
participate in a peer review process; however, there is no top-down
control of decisions and no right of appeal to the Chief ALJ.
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Other managerial/administrative duties include:
 hiring judges,
 general administration of the court operations,
 investigation allegations of misconduct and ethics of ALJs
and hearing officers,
 overseeing management of the Rules Division or
appointing the Codifier of Rules for the State,
 overseeing management of the Civil Rights Division, which
is charged with investigation of claims of discrimination
by state employees,
 serving as a member of the Governor’s Cabinet, and
 presiding over a limited docket of cases.

No formal evaluation process for CPDs exists in more than half
(12/23) of the states, but evaluation procedures that are in practice
include:
 yearly performance plan;
 quarterly performance measures and annual details review
by the governor’s office
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 number of cases heard, appeal rate of decisions, and
customer satisfaction rating;
 constant evaluation by employees and agencies in their
feedback to the governor and umbrella organization’s
director
 oversight committee with four members of the legislature,
representative from governor’s office, and three attorneys;
and
 legislators review, question, and modify the central panel’s
budget and compel supporting data.

Procedures for removing directors vary, but 8/23 states remove
directors for cause, 8/23 states remove directors at the pleasure of
their superior, and in 5/23 states CPDs are employed at will. Other
removal processes include:
 by at least a 3-1 vote of the cabinet; the governor must be
on the side voting to remove;
 when term ends. Term is not concurrent with governor’s
term and not at will;
 upon appointment of a new director;

58

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

39-1

 with public employee protections, removal would be for
cause (performance), promotion, or transfer with no loss
of pay or classification; and
 there is no direct authority for the removal of the director.
Organizational Model
Mandatory v. voluntary use of ALJs

Cases reach the central panel for hearing through agency requests
in nearly 70% (16/23) of states and through litigant requests in nearly
40% (9/23) of states. Close to one third (7/23) of states use both
methods. In several states CPDs noted that the method depends upon
the type of case and/or agency involved.
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Central panel use is always mandatory in only four (17%) states.
Agency heads have the choice to hear cases within the agency or
refer it to the central panel in slightly more than half (12/23) of the
states. There are no states in which agency heads are allowed to refer
cases outside of the agency to entities outside of the central panel.
CPDs in nearly half (11/23) of the states say it depends, but most of
them (9/23) say that central panel use is mandatory in most cases
with only specific exceptions or exemptions.
ALJs – Generalist v. Specialist?
CPD Perspective
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More than half (13/23) of states assign ALJs on a case-by-case
basis. Only two states (9%) assign ALJs to one agency for an
extended period of time. One third of states use different methods to
assign ALJs, including:
 geographically for general jurisdiction ALJs and case-bycase for specialized matters;
 based on a circuit system;
 assignments made monthly for case dockets;
 ALJs are moved between eight main areas when caseloads
fluctuate;
 some are by batch, others case by case;
 most cases are set on pre-calendared dates to which an ALJ
is already assigned;
 some are case-by-case; most develop an expertise (e.g.,
Medicaid cases and workers compensation cases) that
keep them in a unit; and
 case-by-case on dockets.
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Nearly 2/3 (65%) of states do not divide central panels into subunits based on ALJ specialization in technical areas, while 30%
(7/23) of states do. One state divides some of the central panel ALJs
into sub-units while others are general jurisdiction.

ALJ assignments are made with expertise in mind in nearly 2/3
(65%) of states while the other third of states do not assign ALJs
according to their expertise.
Perspectives from Administrative Law Judges About the Role
and Independence of ALJs
We conducted a limited survey of administrative law judges
(ALJs) that included five judges from four states. While these data
certainly are not conclusive due to the very small sample size—we
believe they suggest potential trends and areas for further research to
determine best practices and lessons learned from central panels
nationwide. Summaries of the key findings are below.
Specialization of ALJs
 Most (4/5) ALJs do not believe that an ALJ should have
specific expertise in every area of which he/she presides.
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 All ALJs disagreed or strongly disagreed that ALJs in a
central panel system experience too much variety in the
cases coming before them.
Independence of ALJs
 All reporting ALJs disagree or strongly disagree that
agencies still view ALJs as agency employees.
 All reporting ALJs believe that employment by the central
panel better insulates ALJ decisions from inappropriate
agency influence.
 Most (3/5) reporting ALJs agree or strongly agree that if
central panel ALJs’ office quarters are located within an
agency the ALJs will more likely be subject to
inappropriate agency influence. The other two ALJs were
undecided
 Most (3/5) reporting ALJs believe that a mechanism for
evaluating the job performance of ALJs will not
jeopardize their independence. Two ALJs said that it
depends.
Jurisdiction of ALJs/central panels
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All the central panels we surveyed provide ALJs for contested
hearings. A little more than 20% (5/23) determine the validity of
agency rules. Descriptions of other responsibilities include:
 conduct mediations for state and municipal entities;
 adjudicate all violations of the Code of ordinances for 12
citation issuing departments and agencies;
 adjudicate workers compensation cases; and
 provide ALJs for contested hearings in matters where they
have specific statutory authority. In some instances, they
provide “contract” ALJs for certain other entities where
contested hearings are required.

The types of cases most frequently heard by central panels
include licensing, permit, or certificate applications, suspension or
revocations (22/23) and individual benefit claims, disability
allowances, and workers comp (19/23). Ratemaking or valuations
cases (15/23) and rulemaking and regulations cases (13/23) are
infrequently or never heard by central panels.
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Final Decision-making Authority

Central panels in nearly all (22/23) the states we surveyed require
ALJ decisions to be in writing, and include findings of fact, and
decisions of law. More than half (13/23) say that ALJ decisions are
considered recommendations. Other types of requirements noted for
ALJ decisions include a decision and order, recommendations in
some cases but not all, citations to the record, and policy statements.
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The decision-making authority of central panel ALJs varies
greatly, but the widest agreement (20/23) is on the authority to enter
final decisions only for certain types of cases. The least common
decision-making authority is to enter final decisions on issues of both
fact and law, with agency ability to review and modify sanctions.
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Additional comments demonstrate the wide variety of decisionmaking authority held by central panel ALJs. The most frequent
comments clarified that initial or recommended decisions can
become law after a given number of days (from 30 to 90) and that
some or most decisions are final for particular types of cases, while
other types of cases are exempted.

Agency authority to review ALJ decisions differs widely. The
most common authority belongs to the litigant, who in 70% (16/23)
of states has the opportunity to see the ALJ’s decision before the
agency issues a final order. Comments demonstrate that agency
authority also varies by case type.
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ALJ decisions are accepted as written 70–100% of the time in
20/23 states. ALJ decisions are accepted with modifications less than
10% of the time in nearly half (11/23) of states.
Addressing Agency Concerns with the Creation or Expansion of
a Central Panel System
We also conducted a limited survey of central panel directors
(nine CPDs from nine different states/municipalities). Again, while
these data certainly are not conclusive—due to the very small sample
size—we believe they suggest potential trends and areas for further
research to determine best practices and lessons learned from central
panels nationwide. Summaries of the key findings are below. For
additional discussion from the results of interviews about agency
concerns, please see section on Addressing Agency Concerns with
the Central Panel System on page 46 of this report.
Initial concerns regarding the adoption of a central panel
By far, the most significant concerns regarding the adoption of a
central panel revolved around the agencies’ perceived loss of control.
Additionally, CPDs expressed concerns about agencies’ willingness
to accept recommended decisions that challenged the agencies’ initial
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determinations. Another CPD mentioned concerns regarding
sustainability.
Concerns remaining after initial adoption of central panel
The CPDs who were surveyed on this issue agreed that in the
long run, the initial concerns regarding the adoption of a central panel
were abated. One CPD commented that “the rate of acceptance of
recommended decisions by agency directors, even those that have
gone counter to the initial agency determination, is substantial. In
those cases where the recommended decision goes contrary to the
initial agency, the rate of acceptance of the recommended decision is
about 90%.”
Another CPD commented that “the challenge was political, not
logistical or managerial. Once the political question of prior agency
autonomy was resolved by legislative mandate, there was little
challenge in the execution of that mandate.”
A CPD also noted that “some agencies may not have the win
percentage the agency would like, but the process is well respected.”
While “the agencies did lose some control, the benefits of having an
independent judge far outweigh any issues with control.” Another
CPD noted that while one agency briefly switched back to having its
own hearing officers after an attempt at independent ALJs it did
return back to the independent ALJ system.
Challenges with expansion of central panels
The main challenges noted by CPDs with the expansion of central
panels have revolved around resources and unpredictable swings in
workload. One CPD explained that, “since its creation, numerous
new jurisdictions have been added without new resources.” Other
CPDs expressed concern about “the agency's growth over time,
taking in new subject areas and handling areas that are constantly
evolving and fluctuating” or highly technical matters occasionally
being difficult when the judge assigned had a limited background in
that area. Another CPD noted that “the only current problem comes
during sunset periods when we have to remind legislators of the
reasoning behind the implementation of a central panel.”
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Benefits of central panels

The central panel directors we surveyed on this question cited
multiple benefits of central panels, but the most common (6/9) was
improvements in public trust or perceived impartiality of the
administrative courts. This improvement was illustrated in a
comment from one CPD:
“Of paramount importance is the trust that has built up
with the public that citizens will receive a fair and
impartial hearing forum. There is no doubt that those
persons who participate in administrative litigation
through our central panel feel that regardless of the
outcome, they have been given a fair hearing by an
agency that is independent. This is reflected in our
annually accumulated post hearing surveys. Without
exception, over the last 20 years the number of
participants rating the process as good to excellent
have exceeded 90%.”
CPDs’ desired modifications of the central model in their state
Multiple CPDs commented that they would incorporate more
state agencies into the central panel model if they could. One CPD
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noted expanding the number of local jurisdictions for which they
handle administrative hearings would be desirable. Another CPD
commented that perceived fairness could be improved if they had
enough judges so a party could exclude a judge by right. This
respondent also explained that having more full time ALJs would
help with managing workload, building camaraderie, and providing
for backup.
Would CPDs revert to the administrative law model that existed prior
to the central panel model if they could?
100% of reporting CPDs answered No, they would not (9/9).
Growth
New types of cases that have come under the jurisdiction of the
central panel since its inception
Many CPDs we surveyed noted that the central panels have been
expanding consistently. One explained, “the history in our state is
one of aggregation. The Central Panel started out as a natural
resource hearing panel in 1985 and has never lost a jurisdiction.
Today, it hears all manner of cases.”
The most common new types of cases absorbed by central panels
include workers compensation, tax issues, special education, teacher
dismissal and other employee disciplinary and appeals processes,
public benefits (including SNAP eligibility, Medicaid eligibility,
TANF), medical malpractice, child/adult abuse or neglect, Title IX,
environmental cases, and child support. Following trends in
legislation nationwide, a frequently noted new area of jurisdiction
was marijuana regulation, licensing, and enforcement.
XIV. SUGGESTED PRACTICES OF CENTRAL PANELS AND CENTRAL
PANEL ALJS
Based on our current research, the following are some practices
to be considered:
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 Create an advisory council to give direction, policy
counsel, and advice on the adoption of rules established
by the central panel. Such a reform council could include
a review of current practices and procedures within both
the judicial court system and the administrative hearing
system, with a constructive exchange of ideas and
proposals;
 Create reasonable completion deadlines for ALJ decisions
that are both timely and fair, and seek input from ALJs;
 Implement high application and selection standards for
ALJs;
 Standardize all rules and procedures utilized by the central
panel system from the beginning, rather than adopting
existing fractured rules and procedures from the agencies;
 Assign ALJs hired from agencies to caseloads outside their
former agency in order to minimize any appearance of
bias or impropriety;
 Implement a hybrid system of generalist and specialist
ALJs;
 Direct funding allocation from the legislature;
 Utilize technology, including implementing electronic data
collection systems to track cases and electronic filing
systems as well as permitting parties to access forms
online;
 Implement a complaint process for lawyers and pro se
litigants to voice concerns. Implement consumer
satisfaction surveys for lawyers and litigants. Survey
agency officials for their satisfaction with the central
panel and for their recommendations;
 Require implicit bias training for central panel ALJs;
 Provide training for central panel ALJs that focuses on
approaches to handling the hearing room when one or
more of the parties is unrepresented by legal counsel;
 Focus on increasing diversity among central panel ALJs;
 Continue research on pros and cons of ALJ decision
finality;
 Maintain flexibility in the management of central panels to
handle fluctuating caseloads; and
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 Further investigate the benefits of state-specific practices
including:
o To promote safety and visibility, the North Carolina
central panel conducts a majority of its hearings in
courthouses located throughout the state.
o In Georgia, state legislation has given its central
panel ALJs the ability to issue fines to litigants
and lawyers for disobeying subpoenas, not
following court orders, and other misconduct.
o Newly hired central panel ALJs in North Carolina
are assigned a mentor by the central panel, and
those ALJs receive intensive training at the
National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada.
 Issue an annual report analyzing factors including:
1. Changes in jurisdiction and documentation
of the cost impact of these changes,
2. Expertise in jurisdiction and documentation
of the cost impact of these changes,
3. Case processing time,
4. Case-flow management data, and
5. Cost efficiency data.
XV. CONCLUSION
The central panel concept represents a major change in the way
administrative adjudication is done. Administrative hearing officers
are hearing cases that are equally important to those being heard in
most courtrooms in the state courts. But we have not paid enough
attention to administrative justice, including the decision-making
independence of these administrative hearing officers—the hidden
judiciary.
The benefits of the central panel approach include:
 Increased efficiency,
 Cost effectiveness,
 Enhanced public trust and perceived impartiality among
lawyers and the broader community,
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 An opportunity to bring more transparency to our justice
system as well as to attract higher-quality lawyers who
want to become ALJs.
These benefits are weighed against the commonly expressed
administrative agency concern that the central panel approach leads
to a loss of agency control and a loss of policy expertise at the
adjudicative level.
Despite these concerns, while the pace of creation of new central
panels has slowed in recent years, the jurisdictions of the existing
central panels have increased. The typical growth pattern of central
panels is to see an increasing number of agencies having their cases
heard by central panel ALJs.
The focus on the central panel system has historically been on
whether the central panel brings cost efficiency and whether it brings
an enhanced perception of impartiality. But it also has provided a
laboratory to test new approaches to adjudication. Central panel
directors report an increasing number of new types of cases being
brought into their operation, including issues that have historically
been handled in other types of tribunals such as the state courts of
general jurisdiction. These issues include child support, corrections,
medical leave disputes, and conflicts related to Article IX policies.
Moreover, as central panels become more trusted by the
executive and legislative branches of state government for their
ability to provide high-quality and independent adjudication, they
become the “go to” tribunal for administrative adjudication,
mediation, and rulemaking expertise.
The central panel has also brought new approaches to
adjudication involving large percentages of unrepresented persons—
an issue that our state court systems struggle with on an ongoing
basis.
The central panel movement represents state- and municipalitybased laboratories developing new approaches to resolving disputes.
As a research and advocacy organization focused on identifying and
stopping injustice in the court system, Chicago Appleseed believes
that the central panel movement has become such an important part
of our justice system that it deserves the ongoing attention of social
justice advocates.
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We must ensure that the administrative adjudication portion of
our justice system is accountable and transparent—and the central
panel movement is an important part of this goal. We must make a
review of this system a part of our watchdog/reform efforts—the
lives of hundreds of thousands of persons and businesses are at stake.
XVI. APPENDIX: CENTRAL PANEL SURVEY QUESTIONS
Central Panel Survey Questions – For Central Panel Directors
1. Which state do you work in?
2. Is the information on your website up to date?
3. What is the central panel in your state responsible for? (Bold
all that apply.)
a. Provide ALJs for contested hearings
b. Determine validity of agency rules
c. Other – Please explain.
4. How do cases reach the central panel for hearing? (Bold all
that apply.)
a. Agency requests hearing
b. Litigant requests hearing directly from central panel
c. Other – Please explain.
5. How frequently are the following types of cases heard? Please
answer Frequently, Occasionally, or Never for each type of
case.
a. Licensing, permit, or certificate applications,
suspensions, or revocations
b. Ratemaking or valuations
c. Rulemaking, regulations
d. Individual benefit claims, disability allowances,
worker’s compensation
e. Enforcement proceedings (civil rights, unfair trade,
labor relations, safety, etc.)
f. Other – Please explain.
6. Are the hearing public or private?
7. Are the hearings recorded?
8. How are ALJs recruited? (Bold all that apply.)
a. General advertisement
b. Legal publication
c. State employment bulletin
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d. Informal means
e. Other – Please explain.
9. How are ALJ assignments made?
a. Case-by-case
b. One agency for extended period of time
10. Is the central panel divided into sub-units based on ALJ
specialization in technical areas?
11. Are ALJ assignments made with expertise in mind?
12. Are agencies permitted to refer cases to an entity other than
the central panel?
a. No, central panel use is mandatory.
b. Agency heads have two options: to hear the case
personally and within the agency, or to refer it to the
central panel.
c. Agency heads are allowed to refer cases outside of the
agency to entities other than the central panel.
d. Other – Please explain.
13. Is there a right to counsel?
14. What is required of an ALJ decision? (Bold all that apply.)
a. Must be in writing
b. Findings of fact
c. Decisions of law
d. Recommendation
e. Other – Please Explain.
15. Please select all of the following statements that accurately
describe the finality of ALJ decisions. Please explain your
answers if necessary.
a. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions of fact.
b. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions of law.
c. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions only for
certain types of cases.
d. ALJs have authority to enter final decisions on issues of
both fact and law, but the agency may review to
modify sanctions.
e. ALJs have authority to enter an initial decision that will
become final after a specified number of days if
neither party appeals the decision to the agency head.
(If selecting this option, please indicate the number of
days.)
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f. ALJs only have authority to enter a proposed decision.
The agency must review and enter an order based
thereon before the decision becomes final.
g. The losing party may appeal to the courts from an
adverse ALJ decision.
16. Please select all of the statements below that accurately
describe agency review of ALJ decisions. Please explain your
answers if necessary.
a. On review of the ALJ’s decision, the agency has all the
authority it would have had in making the initial
decision including a full substitution of judgment on
all matters of both fact and law.
b. On review of the proposed decisions the agency must
accept all ALJ fact findings that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole but may
substitute the agency’s conclusions for those of the
ALJ on issues of law and policy.
c. In substituting agency fact findings for ALJ fact
findings, the agency must give an adequate
explanation of why it is rejecting the ALJ’s fact
findings.
d. A litigant has an opportunity to see the ALJ’s decisions
before the agency issues a formal order.
17. To what extent do agencies accept ALJ decisions?
a. Percent accepted as written:
b. Percent accepted with modifications:
18. What new types of cases have come under the jurisdiction of
the central panel since its inception? (Ex. traffic court, child
support, eviction, divorce, probate, etc.)
19. What qualifications are required of a director?
20. How are directors appointed/chosen?
21. What are the duties and responsibilities of the director? (Bold
all that apply.)
a. Initially organize the central panel
b. Develop budget
c. Develop rules of procedure
d. Develop performance standards for ALJs
e. Develop library resources
f. Involved with hiring of ALJs
g. Evaluate ALJs
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h. Review ALJ decisions
i. Oversee training of new ALJs
j. Oversee continuing education of ALJs
k. Assign cases to ALJs
l. Docket cases
m. Manage the office
n. Hire support staff
o. Consult with administrative agencies
p. Consult with the legislature
q. Hear cases
r. Other – Please explain.
22. How long is the director's term?
23. How is the director evaluated?
24. How is the director removed?
25. Does the central panel regularly receive feedback from
private litigants or the agencies under the central panel's
jurisdiction? (an example of this would be satisfaction
surveys administered after the completion of a case.)
26. Thank you for completing our survey. As we mentioned in
the accompanying letter, we would also like to contact
practitioners and agency personnel to learn about the impact
of the central panel on their work. If you have suggestions for
people we should contact, or existing research (such as survey
data or other feedback) we should consider, please indicate
this below. If you have already provided this information to
us by email, please feel free to disregard this.
Central Panel Survey Questions – For Administrative Law
Judges (ALJs)
1. How many years have you been an ALJ with your central
panel office?
2. What was your occupation prior to serving as an ALJ in the
central panel?
3. How did you learn of your current position?
4. What is the selection process for ALJs?
5. Does your position as ALJ represent a financial improvement
or a financial sacrifice when compared to your previous
position? (Bold applicable response.)
a. Improvement
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b. Sacrifice
6. Did you receive your highest academic degree in the state you
are currently employed in? (Bold applicable response.)
a. Yes
b. No
7. What is the term of office for ALJs?
8. What is the removal process for ALJs? (Bold all that apply.)
a. For cause
b. Probationary period
c. Discretionary
d. Other:
9. How are ALJs evaluated? (Bold all that apply.)
a. Annual Review
b. Informal
c. Other:
10. How are salary and promotions determined?
11. In your opinion, will an ALJ evaluation mechanism
jeopardize the independence of ALJs? (Bold applicable
response.)
a. Yes
b. No
c. Other
12. In your opinion, should an ALJ have specific expertise in the
areas over which he/she presides? (Bold applicable response.)
a. Yes
b. No
13. Rate the following resources as: Adequate, Inadequate, Do
not have but desirable, or Do not have and unnecessary
a. Law library
b. Personal law clerk
c. Shared law clerk
d. Personal secretarial assistance
e. Subscriptions to legal periodicals or commercial
services
f. Regular policy briefings by agency officials
g. Hearing manual for ALJs
h. Technical assistance by designated staff member
i. Index of prior ALJ decisions
j. Uniform rules of practice for all hearings
k. State of the art office equipment
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l. Financial support for attending continuing education
seminars, meetings
14. Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree, or
Strongly Disagree
a. An ALJ should be free to deviate from the central panel
rules of hearing procedure if the situation necessitates.
b. ALJs are adequately compensated for their work.
c. An ALJ’s skills are utilized more effectively in a
central panel system.
d. ALJs in a central panel system experience too much
variety in the cases coming before them.
e. ALJs are under undue pressure to decide cases quickly.
f. Agency officials still view ALJs as agency employees.
g. If an ALJ is employed by a central panel his/her
decisions will be better insulated from inappropriate
agency influence.
h. A central panel ALJ whose office quarters are located
within an agency will more likely be subject to
inappropriate agency influence.
i. An ALJ should be free to deviate from the central panel
rules of hearing procedure if the situation necessitates.
j. ALJs are adequately compensated for their work.
k. An ALJ’s skills are utilized more effectively in a
central panel system.
l. ALJs in a central panel system experience too much
variety in the cases coming before them.
m. ALJs are under undue pressure to decide cases quickly.
n. Agency officials still view ALJs as agency employees.
o. If an ALJ is employed by a central panel his/her
decisions will be better insulated from inappropriate
agency influence.
p. A central panel ALJ whose office quarters are located
within an agency will more likely be subject to
inappropriate agency influence.
15. How much of the total time spent doing your job is devoted to
the following activities? 0-10%, 10-20%, 20-30%, 30-40%,
40-50%, 50-60%, 60-70%, 70- 80%, 80-90%, or 90-100%
a. Pretrial preparation (readings researching, etc.)
b. Conducting pre-hearing conferences and negotiations
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c. Presiding at formal hearings
d. Written decisions
e. Travel
f. Administrative duties
g. Other hearing-related activities
h. Pretrial preparation (reading, researching, etc.)
i. Conducting pre-hearing conferences and negotiations
j. Presiding at formal hearings
k. Written decisions
l. Travel
m. Administrative duties
n. Other hearing-related activities
16. How frequently do you engage in the following work-related
activities? Frequently, Occasionally, or Infrequently/Never
a. Read decisions of other ALJs
b. Read final agency decisions or opinions
c. Read industry publications or commercial services
d. Consult other ALJs for advice or information prior to
hearing
e. Consult other ALJs while case is pending
f. Request drafts of decisions from your law clerk
g. Talk with individual members of the private bar about
agency procedures
h. Make suggestions to agency officials about policy
changes
i. Disqualify yourself from hearing a case
j. Attend professional meetings or seminars
k. Wear a robe during a hearing
17. Which of the following general categories of proceedings do
you frequently preside over? (Bold all that apply.)
a. Licensing
b. Ratemaking
c. Rulemaking
d. Enforcement
e. Benefits
18. Rate the frequency with which you do the following
activities: Frequently, In some cases, or Never
a. Conduct pre-hearing conferences
b. Direct counsel to brief certain legal issues
c. Go off the record to deal with procedural problems
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d. Question witnesses directly
e. Call in witnesses on your own initiative
f. Admit evidence for whatever it may be worth
g. Deliver decisions orally
h. Rule on requests for discovery
i. Employ sanctions for improper conduct in hearing room

